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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

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I

THE ELDER PITT AND HIS ADMIRALS AND GENERALS

BY ERIC McDERMOTT, S.J.*

For two hundred years the elder Pitt has been regarded as one of the greatest of England's war administrators. His praises were loudly sung in his own lifetime and the chorus has not yet ceased. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider some of the aspects of Pitt's career and to see what opportunities offer themselves for a reappraisal of his achievements.

William Pitt, the first Earl of Chatham, will be forever associated with the French and Indian War fought between England and France in the middle years of the eighteenth century. It is a war that has probably been underestimated by many historians. But one of the greatest of them, one who has done so much to elucidate the complex events of that time, Lawrence Henry Gipson, in his study of the war published in 1954, goes so far as to declare that "no war in modern times down to the beginning of the twentieth century, had, by reason of the manner of its termination, consequences so permanent and

profound in their nature over so large a part of the world."¹

In that war Pitt has been universally acclaimed the chief architect of victory.

The case of the elder Pitt, his colleagues and his service chiefs is a story of military blindness, of the blindness of historians and even more of the fatal facility with which good reasons offer a tremendous obstacle to the discovery of the real reasons.

It shows the inability of military men to use their imaginations. It shows their overpowering eagerness to fight wars of their own choosing and on their own terms. If these terms cannot be realised, then the military men blame the circumstances of their lot and not their own lack of vision and adaptability.

But the historians have shown blindness in not casting their gaze beyond the documents that immediately concern their subject of enquiry. Over and over again the story of Pitt has been quarried from the Chatham,

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¹L. H. Gibson, *The Great War for the Empire, The Culmination, 1759-1763* (Knopf, New York, 1954), Preface.

the Newcastle, and the Hardwicke Papers. These papers are multitudinous, and, as a result, it is always possible to discover something new in them, something ignored or unremarked by previous writers; but it hardly seems possible to make any *notable* discoveries in the papers now. Certainly, however, what seems necessary is to put in some major detective work on the evidence already accumulated in print. This detective work needs to be done from two points of view. Firstly, it is necessary to put the very simple question: Is it possible to find evidence of Pitt's effectiveness as a war administrator elsewhere than in his own papers?

It would seem obvious that an excellent source of knowledge would be the papers of the military men who had to carry out his orders. These men, surely, would be in the best of all positions for estimating Pitt's worth. And the place to begin would be the scene of Pitt's greatest endeavour, namely, the Canadian campaign. It so happens that some of the military men particularly concerned with this campaign have left voluminous sets of papers. Two of these military commanders have been very carefully studied by a great American scholar, Stanley Pargellis. However, the recent biographers of Pitt seem to have paid no heed at all to his work. In his study of *Loudoun* and in his edition of the Cumberland Papers Dr. Pargellis strongly criticises the work of Pitt.² But Brian Tunstall who published his lengthy study of Pitt in 1938,³ five years after Dr. Pargellis published his *Loudoun* and two years after the edition of the Cumberland Papers, and Sherrard who published the second volume of his even more lengthy biography of Pitt in the summer of 1955, seem to make no mention of these criticisms

so strongly brought against Pitt.⁴ To what is this historical myopia due? Is it because Tunstall has been too absorbed in the Navy to consider the Army?

The shortsightedness of Sherrard is emphasized by the fact that he has named his first two volumes *The War Minister in the Making* and *The Seven Years' War*, which would seem to clamour for an adequate treatment of the military evidence. Perhaps the reason is that it has been too lightly taken for granted that the generally accepted account of Pitt is so well based that further enquiry will not change the view.

Sherrard in his recent study of Pitt has formulated fresh interpretations of some of the evidence provided by the Chatham, Newcastle, and Hardwicke Papers. It usually has been accepted that Pitt did well to form a coalition with Newcastle in order to return to office as Secretary of State for the Southern Department. But now this view is questioned. It may be that this coalition did Pitt more harm than good. Sherrard thinks that if Pitt had held out a little longer he could have arranged the government to suit his fancy and on his own terms. Moreover it is suggested that the two jobs for which Newcastle was thought eminently suitable and successful, namely the obtaining of the King's approval for Pitt's unusual schemes and the manipulation of the Commons so that sufficient money could be found to put them into execution, were not in fact properly performed.

The question of Newcastle's work as a financier seems not to have been adequately examined. Indeed Basil Williams begs that someone would produce an adequate life of the Duke, for the writing of which so much documentary material is available.⁵ With re-

²Stanley H. Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun in North America* (New Haven, 1933).

³W. C. Brian Tunstall, *William Pitt, Earl of Chatham* (London, 1938).

⁴Owen A. Sherrard, *Lord Chatham, a War Minister in the Making* (London, 1952); *Pitt and the Seven Years War* (London, 1955).

⁵Basil Williams, *The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760* (Oxford, 1939).

gard to Newcastle's position as a liaison minister in the Royal Closet, it may well be that since Newcastle shared the King's old-fashioned strategical views, he may have reinforced the King's prejudices against Pitt's schemes.

In the interpretation of Pitt's career it may be that good reasons have blinded historians to the real reasons.

Pitt had a brief period of power from the end of 1756 to the early months of 1757 and then after a short interval up to his resignation in 1761. During all this period he was officially the Secretary of State for the Southern Department. There was another Secretary of State for the Northern Department, namely Lord Holderness, and the chief or prime minister was the First Lord of the Treasury—the Duke of Devonshire to begin with, and later the Duke of Newcastle.

Both Secretaries of State were theoretically equally competent to act in every matter that concerned the country's home affairs; but in foreign affairs they divided the countries of Europe into the northern and southern states; hence their official titles. Not merely were home affairs within their joint and equal competence but also the control of the armed services. Thus it was possible for contradictory orders to be given to the service departments by the two Secretaries of State. There were two safeguards against this. One was that the King's approval, as the head of the executive, was required for all major decisions of every kind and, more important, it was usual for one Secretary to dominate his colleague.

Work of lesser import was thus left to Holderness, as Secretary of State for the Northern Department, while the Duke of Newcastle had the twofold job of getting the King's approval for Pitt's plans and of providing adequate money for their execution.

For the execution of his orders Pitt had a

small office staff which he partly shared with Lord Holderness and, of course, he had the service departments whose ponderous procedures needed to be repeatedly galvanised by Pitt's abounding energy.

Pitt was not only handicapped by needing the King's approval for his plans; he must first persuade his cabinet colleagues of their feasibility and advisability. While the government could be regarded as consisting of as many as two dozen ministers and officers of state, Pitt was chiefly concerned with a small policy-making group of three men. These ministers, usually called the Inner Cabinet, were the chief minister and First Lord of the Treasury, the Duke of Newcastle, and a former Lord Chancellor, Lord Hardwicke, Newcastle's chief adviser and "a comforting receptacle for Newcastle's grievances."⁶ Occasionally this small group broadened itself to become what has been called the Secret Committee of Council by the addition of ministers like Lord Anson, the First Lord of the Admiralty. On most occasions Pitt was able to get his way with these men and carry through his policies. But often there was opposition and stormy scenes ensued; and Pitt was bitterly criticised for his overbearing manner. In this manner did Pitt as Secretary of State for the Southern Department get into his hands the whole direction of the war effort, both as regards home and foreign operations.

The major problem, however, that Pitt had to face at the beginning of his assumption of power was the problem of the King's younger son, Cumberland. Cumberland had been captain-general of the British Army since 1745. It seems likely that Pitt saw in Cumberland's position a great constitutional menace. For a century Englishmen had agitated against a standing army as a danger to their liberties. The Civil War of the mid-

⁶*Ibid.* 326

seventeenth century had left many scars, which it was in the interest of the Whigs to keep fresh in the popular mind. Accordingly when it had been necessary to raise large armies, as on the occasion of the Jacobite rebellion of 1715 and the War of the Austrian Succession, the problem arose as to the proper commander for these forces. The problem was posed not so much by the possibility that the commander might stage a military coup as by the immense powers that would lie in his hands through the military patronage at his disposal.

The last Captain-General, the Duke of Ormonde, had been impeached for Jacobitism in '15. None succeeded him until the appointment of the Duke of Cumberland in 1745. This appointment was made for two reasons: The struggle against France required a unified command; and the appointment of a younger son of the King seemed likely to ensure that the patronage of the office might not be used for political purposes. As it turned out, however, the need of the governments of the day for all the political support they could get made it impossible for the King to forgo the use of his military patronage for that purpose. Thus it seemed to many, and not least to Pitt, that Cumberland represented a menace to civilian control of the army. The retention of his position after the peace of 1748, and the parliamentary support he conjured up to have himself made regent mightily supported the idea.

This menace was emphasised from another point of view. Not merely did the Duke dispose of the army with the approval of the King, including the awarding of commissions; but he had the ear of the King. He was therefore the most useful man that the government could find to secure the royal assent to their military plans. As a consequence the Duke of Newcastle summoned him to sit in on cabinet discussions. Cumberland thus

seemed to present a unique figure in the political life of the day. He was at the heart of the most secret policy discussions, he had control of a respectable body of votes in the Commons by his control of military patronage, and he had the ear of the King. Accordingly, Pitt made it his business to do all he could to get the Duke removed from his office. This hostility was well-known to Cumberland. He was unprepared to take command in Germany with an unfriendly government at home. As a consequence he refused to depart unless Pitt was dismissed, and the King, therefore, had no option but to demand that Pitt resign his seals of office, which he did on 6 April 1757.

Such is the usual view of the events of the time. However, Sherrard in his very recent book has seen fit to lay great stress on the work of Fox in all this matter. Cumberland had not merely a body of parliamentary votes but he was also the centre of a small political party, whose prominent members were the Duke of Bedford and Henry Fox. Fox was a great political rival of Pitt; and Sherrard suggests that it was Fox who really engineered Pitt's dismissal in 1757 by making use of Cumberland's influence. It may be, nevertheless, that Sherrard has not read widely enough. While there is no doubt of the political rivalry between Fox and Pitt, there may be some doubt of the strength of the influence which Fox and Bedford could exercise over Cumberland. For example, it seems that Fox and Bedford were particularly interested in the American campaign and wished the Duke of Cumberland to send more troops there; but he seems to have resisted that plea and preferred to concentrate much of his effort in Germany, as being the area where Hanoverian interests were touched most closely and where military glory of the traditional type could be more easily acquired.

It has been remarked by historians that Pitt expended great effort in preparing for

the various expeditions which he ordered. And indeed there can be no doubt that his energy in promoting efficiency in all the departments of the military services is one of his most considerable claims to fame. In this connection it has been customary to cite the evidence of his very detailed instructions to the army commanders and the governors in North America, to show Pitt's solicitude for the men in the army, his amazing interest in every detail of the campaigns and his eagerness to leave nothing to chance. It has, however, been pointed out by Dr. Pargellis that the campaign for the conquest of Canada may well be regarded as a miserable affair, prolonged by Pitt's incompetence and bungling and only redeemed by Wolfe's epic assault on Quebec.

It was only by bitter experience that British commanders learned that continental tactics were impossible in the North American campaign. It required one or two campaigns to get this experience. Loudoun, the commander in America, who at last seemed to be on the point of realizing a successful campaign, was prematurely removed by Pitt because he was feared to be too much a creature of Cumberland. Moreover, the subsequent campaign plans prepared by Pitt were unsuitable for the territory, and his new commanders, like Amherst, Abercromby and Wolfe, had to spend valuable time in learning the secrets of North American warfare. Moreover, the very minuteness of detail in which Pitt laid down the campaign plans left his commanders little discretion, and they complained bitterly that they were so handicapped in their work. It is noteworthy that Pitt never attempted to give such detailed orders to the navy. In consequence it may be that Pitt's mishandling of the North American campaign prolonged the struggle there for two unnecessary years.

Pitt is often thought to be outstanding for his mastery of the true strategy required by the changing nature of the warfare of the

times, and that, contrariwise, too many of the military men lacked the vision of military possibilities which he saw so clearly and put into operation so successfully. On the other hand it may well be that Pitt's predecessors have not had their due meed of recognition. There is probably little that is new in Pitt's strategical thinking. The numerous wars with France over the previous seventy years had long before divided military planners into the continental and the maritime schools. Those who thought that England should devote all her strength to the sea and to the attacking of French colonial possessions were merely emphasizing an axiom of warfare that the attack must be made where one's forces are strongest and where one's enemy is weakest. There was no doubt that England was always weak on the continent compared to France. The difference in population between the two countries is too often ignored. France would always be able to put four times the number of men in the field. Those who stressed the development of sea power and the destruction of the French possessions overseas were known as the maritime school of strategy. To this school Pitt belonged before he assumed office.

The other school known as the continental school did not despise sea power, but maintained the view that it was impossible to keep the control of the seas against the whole weight of French power. French resources in men and money must make them able in the long run to outbuild England in any race for maritime supremacy. Moreover the system of inscription which France had had since Colbert's days provided her with a large reserve of seamen. Despite the pamphleteering of Defoe and the efforts of many far-seeing statesmen English methods of recruitment for the navy were as unsatisfactory as could be imagined. The result was that the continental school of strategists was convinced that unless the forces of France were

distracted by continental warfare England would certainly lose control of the sea; and the theatre of the war would be the English countryside, as a consequence of a French invasion in strength.

The continentals, however, did not believe that England should go in for extensive fighting on the continent; but rather that she should seek allies there and support them with money and small forces of troops, chiefly mercenaries. Pitt, on the other hand, long agitated in the early years of his political career for an end of the perpetual foreign subsidies and for the applying of the money to building up the fleet and strengthening the colonial forces. But on his assumption of power he gave steady support both in money and men to the King of Prussia.

The situation was complicated by the fact that George II was also Elector of Hanover. Accordingly he was strongly of the opinion that England must make every effort to protect the Electorate which he loved so much. Thus both the King and his son, Cumberland, the captain-general, were convinced continentals. This very fact tended to make any political opponents of the various ministries of George II's reign also strategical opponents. There can be little doubt that Pitt's maritime strategical views had partly developed as an offshoot of his political views.

It is of interest and importance to note that French strategists were also divided into similar continental and maritime schools. But they seem to have been of the opinion that they would never be able to challenge effectively England's naval supremacy to the extent of permanently destroying her colonial empire. On the contrary they thought that it was far better for them to fight on the continent where they were strongest, and trust to George II's great love for Hanover to ensure that any loss of French colonial possessions could be balanced at the peace by the French conquest of Hanover. As M.

d'Argenson declared: "*On doit conquérir l'Amerique en Allemagne.*"⁷ They were reinforced in their view because Louisbourg, the guardian of the St. Lawrence approach to Canada, had been traded back to France eight years before in return for the French evacuation of the Low Countries.

Nor was Pitt at all inventive in his use of conjunct operations against the French mainland. These had been made use of by Marlborough, though not on quite so large a scale. But even so they were unhappy affairs, if not failures. Rochefort in 1757, St. Malo and Cherbourg in 1758, achieved little. Sherrard goes so far as to suggest that the King and Newcastle did their best to destroy Rochefort's chance of success in order to force Pitt to concentrate on the German campaign. There can be no doubt that part of the trouble was that the commanders were badly chosen.

It is true that the King had to approve all appointments to the higher commands and that he was rarely prepared to agree to young men being promoted to the chief commands. Nevertheless it may be that on the one hand Pitt never insisted strongly enough on suitable men, and on the other hand that Pitt was no great judge of military men. There is evidence to suggest that he made many bad appointments. He could hardly avoid appointing the more zealous and energetic officers, since their reputations were generally widely known. Many of them in fact probably owed more to the earlier encouragement and perspicacity of the Duke of Cumberland than to Pitt's judgment.

Be that as it may, it is noteworthy that all the best army officers longed for service in Germany. Without exception they seemed to have regarded colonial campaigning as of no value for their military reputations. The

⁷Herbert W. Richmond, *Statesman and Sea Power* (Oxford, 1946), p. 130.

Prussian army was the general cynosure, and the military developments associated with the name of Leopold of Anhalt-Dessauer won the attention of every keen officer.

Does all the foregoing discussion show that Pitt has been vastly over-rated? Not at all. It means that it is time to look into the story of Pitt with fresh eyes and with a larger viewpoint. It will take a great deal of solid evidence to refute the considered view of the

greatest English historian of the strategy of the Seven Years' War, Sir Julian Corbett, when he says that Pitt was the greatest war administrator that England ever produced; or the view of a French writer on the Seven Years' War, quoted by Captain A. T. Mahan, that England "had conquered solely by the superiority of her government."⁸

⁸Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston, 1895), p. 328.

II

CONSCRIPTION IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1900-1914: A FAILURE IN CIVIL-MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS?

BY THEODORE ROPP*

The "blood tax" of conscription is one of the most sensitive points in civil-military relations. Though surprisingly little has been done on the details of its development in Continental Europe, even less has been done on conscription in the Anglo-American countries, on the ways in which the pressures of foreign and domestic policies have modified a common tradition. Though conscription has been a major political issue in all of these countries, a comparative study should start with the movement for conscription in Britain before 1914. Its failure shows that civil-military communications involve far more than the difficulties faced by military men in trying to persuade civilians to adopt new, unpopular policies, that the problem cannot be solved by catchwords about military wisdom and civilian shortsightedness.

One of the best examples of this thesis is in Leopold Amery's introduction to David James' recent biography of Lord Roberts, the most important public figure in the conscription movement. After charging Roberts' pupil, Ian Hamilton (who wrote a book op-

posing conscription)¹ and Lord Haldane (the Liberal minister whose name is attached to the reorganization of the British army after the Boer War) with political cowardice, Amery states that Roberts favored conscription both for home defense and "as a really ample reserve for the expansion of the Army overseas." But, as James points out in the body of the book, Roberts first refused the presidency of the National Service League because he feared that it might make compulsory training for Home Defence into "Conscription," here defined as "compulsory service in the Army overseas."² This paper is not based on exhaustive research. It has been written to clarify the questions which must be asked when considering this issue in other Anglo-American countries and to suggest some of the complexities of civil-military communications.

One question has already been raised. "Were British soldiers convinced of the need for this drastic break with tradition?" Actually many, if not most, British soldiers supported the Haldane reforms. Though these

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¹*Compulsory Service* (London, 1910).

²*Lord Roberts* (London, 1954). xi, 415.

reforms did not, as it turned out, meet "the problem with which a German war confronted us,"³ they seemed to meet the problem as it was analyzed by many British military men after the Boer War. Mr. Amery's charge is thus only a variation of the charges which have been made against every army in Europe. None of them saw what was going to happen in 1914.

In 1897, to return to our subject before the Boer War, there were 667,000 men, not including colonials and the Indian army, in the British army. A third (216,000) were Regulars. This figure did not change materially from the end of the Indian Mutiny (240,000 men in 1860) to 1913 (247,000). The Cardwell and Haldane reforms thus dealt with the organization and functions of the Regulars and the composition of the Reserves, not with the size of the Regular army. In 1897 the 110,000 men of the Regular and Militia Reserves (30,000 men who, for a pound a year, were willing to be sent out of the country) were the only reserves by Continental European standards. The others—55,000 Volunteers, 75,000 Militia, and 9,500 Yeomanry—half of the total army, had not had to pass through the Regular machine and could not be sent out of the country.

This last clause, so deeply imbedded in the militia tradition, has been a major barrier to conscription in the Anglo-American countries. Since few experts took the danger of a large scale invasion seriously, the conscriptionists could be charged with either stupidity or duplicity, that is of using Compulsory Service for Home Defence as the entering wedge for Conscription for overseas service. It also brought them into conflict with the Navy and the Navy League, forces far superior to theirs in both numbers and effectiveness. In the official inquiry on invasion in 1907, for example, Lord Roberts came under heavy

naval fire. Tweedmouth (the First Lord of the Admiralty) opened by asking Roberts about "the inducements which caused you to take up the case brought forward by this little ring of . . . very wild, though self-convinced alarmists." Still Tweedmouth was gentler than Cobden had been with the aged Wellington in 1847 when he noted in a public speech that the Duke "had passed the extremest duration of human existence and was tottering on the verge of the grave."⁴

With Britain spending huge sums on the Naval Defence and Fortifications Acts during the early 1890's, conscription (to use James' terminology) for overseas service seemed remote indeed before the Boer War. "The primary duty of the military authorities," according to the Stanhope Memorandum of 1891, was "to organize our forces efficiently for the defence of this country." The Volunteers and Militia would man the forts, and the invader would be brought to bay by the Regulars. In the "improbable" event of an overseas war, the Regulars would furnish two army corps, the force that was actually to be sent to France in 1914. In 1897, few British officers had any idea of the difficulties of organizing such a force, though Col. Cooper-King, in the survey which I have just quoted, realized that the time was "past since an army of 25,000 men was considered a respectable command for a serious European war; and the changes in conditions is even greater now, with all Europe an armed camp, and the armies themselves counting as many thousands as they did hundreds when George the Third was King."⁵

The Boer War played the role in British military history which the Spanish-American War played in the military history of the United States. Its tactical lessons were overshadowed by two other revelations—the in-

³L. S. Amery, *My Political Life* (I. London, 1953), 213.

⁴James, *Roberts*, 414, 431.

⁵C. Cooper-King, *The Story of the British Army* (London, 1894), 400.

ability of the British Army to throw two army corps overseas, and the depth of anti-British feeling on the Continent, particularly in Germany. The conscriptionists, who organized the National Service League in February 1902, stressed the dangers of invasion while the army was in South Africa. Their opponents felt that they were diverting public attention from the immediate task of organizing a striking force for overseas service.

These ideas were probably best expressed by Col. G. F. R. Henderson, the ablest military writer in Britain since the death of Edward Hamley. Since Henderson died as the inquiries into the South African war were getting under way, he was not personally involved in any of the controversies which followed. Henderson had become interested in the Volunteers during the invasion scare of the 1880's. His first work, the *Campaign of Fredericksburg*, was written for Volunteer officers. Though his Civil War studies convinced him "of the truth of the old adage that one volunteer is worth three pressed men"—a statement which shows how little he understood the differences between Civil War conscription and the German or French citizen armies—he admitted that Volunteers would need "the shelter of stout earthworks at the beginning of a war" and that "the idea of transforming the Militia and Volunteers into an army of marksmen, capable of coping with the picked infantry of the Continent, is a vain dream. Marksmanship in a great mass of men depends on discipline and not on patriotism, and to believe that a large mass of men will become efficient soldiers, except under compulsion, is to disregard human nature."⁶

This would seem to place Henderson with the conscriptionists, but he never thought of defense against mass invasion or of raising a mass army for a Continental war. Though

this side of Henderson has been neglected by admirers of his Civil War works, he fully appreciated the importance of sea power, as can be seen in his discussion of the sea as a line of operations in his remarkable article on war for the 1902 supplement to the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Since "Surprise and freedom of movement are pre-eminently the weapons of the Power that commands the sea," a striking force of two army corps might well enable Britain to tip the balance in a future Continental struggle. Such a force would have to be composed of professionals, though Britain did not yet have one because of defective War Office organization. The War Office had simply thrown "regulars, . . . militia, and . . . volunteers, in all stages of training and cohesion . . . promiscuously on a far-off coast, there to take form and substance as an invading force."⁷

Henderson's analysis was probably sound. Though it cannot be proved, it was probably the analysis of most thoughtful soldiers in the series of commissions and committees, which through several changes at the War Office and in the party line-up hammered out the Haldane reforms. The first major investigation, the Elgin commission, was one of those broad fact-finding inquiries so characteristic of Anglo-American politics after military shock. In Edward VII's blunt words, it was to look into the "many blunders we made in South Africa." Its key man was Viscount Esher, the real architect of the Haldane reforms. Its report, issued early in 1903, contained one sentence which was to be picked up by both the conscriptionists and Denia Hayes, the author of the only extended historical study of this problem. Hayes suspects conscriptionism in every Conservative, but I expect that the sentence means what it says, that "no military system will be satisfactory which does not contain powers of

⁶*The Science of War* (London, 1913), 424.

⁷*Ibid.*, 35, 385.

expansion outside the limit of the Regular Forces of the Crown,"⁸ a truism if there ever was one.

In any case the Elgin commission spawned three others, whose work is a classic study in administrative history. Since no important politician in either party seriously considered conscription, one commission was appointed to get on with the job of reorganizing the War Office. The other two were simply sops to those important elements, particularly in the House of Lords, who had so long controlled the "constitutional force" of the Militia, the even more blueblooded Yeomanry, and the Volunteers.

The members of the famous "Esher" War Office (Reconstitution) Committee were Esher, who preferred this job to the War Office itself, Sir John Fisher, and Sir George Clarke, the future Secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee. The Yeomanry Commission consisted of Lord Harris, a well known cricketer and sometime Undersecretary of State for War, and six Yeomanry officers. It called no witnesses and took no testimony and dissolved after a split report on various minutiae.

The Commission on the Volunteers and Militia consisted of the Duke of Norfolk, the Earl of Derby, Baron Grenfell, Sir Cole-ridge Groves, Sir Ralph Knox, four lieutenant Colonels of the Militia or Volunteers, and the military historian Spenser Wilkinson. Though it was to inquire into the military efficiency of the Militia and Volunteers, at a suspiciously early stage in the proceedings it decided to question various high officials about the danger of invasion. The Admiralty, the Lord President of the Council, and the Committee of Imperial Defence tried to put off the Commission, only to find them as eager to listen to the officials of the National Service League as the latter were to testify.

The thirteen hundred and forty page Commission report suggested numerous detailed reforms and then commented that these alone would not make the Militia and Volunteers "equal to the task of defeating a modern Continental army in the United Kingdom."

The principles which have been adopted, after the disastrous failure of older methods, by every great State of the European continent, are first, that as far as possible the whole able-bodied male population shall be trained to arms; secondly, that the training shall be given in a period of continuous service. . . . and thirdly, that the instruction shall be given by a body of specially educated and highly trained officers.

. . . Only by the adoption of these principles can an army for home defence, adequate in strength and military efficiency to defeat an invader, be raised and maintained in the United Kingdom."⁹

This explains continental conscription very well, probably in the words of Spenser Wilkinson, who so ably summarized the German system of war for the British public. His later *Britain at Bay* was equally outspoken. "Great Britain's battles must be fought and won on the enemy's territory and against an army raised and maintained on the modern national principle."¹⁰

This was straight out of Continental theory and pure political poison. So was the Norfolk Commission's report which rested its whole case on the possibility of a mass invasion. In addition, the Commission's blue-blooded membership and the later membership of the National Service League linked conscription with the most conservative wing of the Conservative (and opposition) party. After becoming president of the League, Lord Roberts supported National Service, military training in the schools, and the protective tariff, and opposed the reform of the House of Lords and the ultra-radicals and socialists whom he believed had come to control the

⁸*Conscription Conflict* (London, 1949), 29.

⁹*Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰(London, 1909), 142.

Liberal party. This link with the extreme Conservatives was in direct contrast to France where conscription was part of the revolutionary heritage of 1793. The National Service League also had its quota of lunatic fringe alarmists, men like Robert Blatchford and the historian J. A. Cramb, plus such "respectable" historians as G. G. Coulton and F. J. C. Hearnshaw. Both of them used the obvious and very English argument that "It is not National Service but the Voluntary System that is un-English and unhistoric."¹¹

Roberts had been converted to conscription only after his retirement. By that time the Haldane reforms had already been worked out by the reformers. Roberts' bill for four months compulsory training in the Territorials (which had replaced the old Auxiliary Forces) got 103 votes in the House of Lords in 1909. They came from 98 Unionists, four Liberals, and the Bishop of Oxford. Lord Lansdowne, who had refused the support of the Unionist front bench, commented that its introduction in the Lords "was by no means the best manner to prepare people for it."¹²

Was Britain's failure to adopt conscription, then, a "failure in civil-military communications"? I think not, for reasons which can be summarized as follows:

(1) Many British soldiers were not convinced of the need for conscription. There was no "military" opinion on this issue.

(2) This confusion, especially during the decisive years immediately after the Boer War, reflected the uncertainties of British foreign policy. Even in 1914, Britain's commitments to France were unknown to most soldiers and civilians.

(3) The campaign for conscription was poorly timed. Years later, Sir William Robertson wrote that,

Lord Roberts, on becoming Commander-in-Chief, missed a great opportunity for putting matters on a more efficient footing. His high reputation as a commander administrator had been enhanced by the skill and rapidity with which he had retrieved the situation in South Africa in 1900. The Secretary for War . . . was anxious to have his advice and as far as possible to act upon it. The Cabinet welcomed him as one upon whose judgment they could rely, and there is reason to believe that they would even have hesitated to reject the principle of universal military service had he declared it to be necessary. He was a popular favourite, and the nation, angry at the defects brought to light in the early stages of the war, was ready to support him in almost any demands which he might put forward.

Why he did not make better use of these unique conditions it is difficult to say, but some possible reasons may be mentioned. He was over sixty-eight years of age, and the arduous campaign through which he had just been, coupled with the loss of his only son, did not tend to make him feel younger . . . His numerous campaigns . . . on and beyond the Indian frontiers were probably more misleading than helpful in his endeavor to appraise the characteristics of European warfare. . . .

Although . . . I was not in a position to know what passed between him and the Government, . . . I do know . . . that ministerial sanction for military measures is sometimes very difficult to obtain. This difficulty inevitably occurs, sooner or later, let the relations between the civil and military chiefs be as good as they may, and as a rule it springs from one of two causes. *The Minister may be unable to appreciate the technical reasons underlying a given proposal, while the soldier finds it hard to explain them in such a way that they can be understood.* Further, however ready a Minister may be to act on professional advice, he is always embarrassed by the necessity of having to consider, first and foremost, how much action may affect the political well-being of the Government of which he is a member.¹³

(4) The membership of the National Ser-

¹¹Especially in Hearnshaw's *The Ancient Defence of England* (London, 1916).

¹²James, *Roberts*, 439.

¹³*Soldiers and Statesmen* (2 vols., London, 1926), I, 16-17.

vice League tied conscription in the public mind with, to use a modern phrase, "Colonel Blimpism."

(5) The linking of conscription with home defence tied it to the militia tradition. But the danger of invasion could be questioned. This issue, and such subsidiary issues as the use of conscription for training in citizenship to check the rising tide of "socialism," diverted attention from more serious questions of military policy. (The whole concept of the army as a school is, incidentally, a fasci-

nating subject for research.)

The failure of the conscriptionists to define their aims and methods more precisely had an odd sequel. When Kitchener took the helm in 1914, he did not use the Territorials (who had been so vigorously attacked as inadequate by the conscriptionists) to expand the army. Nor did he follow up the conscription campaign (bringing down Mr. Amery's retrospective wrath on him too). He chose to raise an entirely new army on a volunteer basis.

III

1898: THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC

By LOUIS J. HALLE*

Historical studies—if a non-historian may venture into definition—are properly studies in perspective. I use "perspective" in the sense given it by Funk & Wagnalls': "The relative importance of facts or matters from any special point of view."¹ Note that importance, here, is only relative. It depends on a "special point of view."

I do not believe that the subject of civil-military relations was given importance or was much debated by us Americans, if at all, around the year 1898. About that time the aged Prince Von Bismarck published some wise remarks on the subject in his memoirs,²

but we Americans had been happily without experience in the conduct of war for over a generation. Therefore we lacked any "special point of view" that would have given the subject importance.

Happily or unhappily, this is no longer true today. Our experience has accumulated and we begin, at last, to equal Bismarck. Few subjects in the realm of our governmental organization today loom larger than that of civil-military relations. How the civil and military elements should work together for the determination of our foreign policy has become a major preoccupation.

To establish our own special perspective, let me now quote from an article by Dean Acheson in the *Yale Review* of Autumn, a year ago. "It may seem extraordinary," writes Mr. Acheson, "but it is nevertheless true, that not until General Marshall's tenure

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¹*New Standard Dictionary of the English Language* (New York, 1949.)

²"... the object of war is to conquer peace under conditions which are conformable to the policy pursued by the state. To fix and limit the objects to be attained by the war, and to advise the monarch in respect to them, is and remains during the war just as before it a political function, and the manner in which these questions are solved cannot be without influence on the method of conducting the war. . . . The negotiations at Nikolsburg in 1866 show that the question of war

or peace always belongs, even in war, to the responsible political minister, and cannot be decided by the technical military leaders." Prince Otto von Bismarck, "Reflections and Reminiscences," translated under the title *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman* (New York: Harpers, 1899), II, 106.

as Secretary of Defense had the Secretary of State and his senior officers met with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for continuous discussion and development of policy. And yet foreign policy and military policy divorced from one another are both operating in the field of phantasy."³

What was true of our practice half-a-dozen years ago was certainly no less true in 1898. I am reminded of a lecturer who, having for his topic "The Natural Resources of Libya," began his lecture with the statement: "Libya has no natural resources." In addressing itself to our civil-military relations at the time of the war with Spain this paper also treats of what is, in some respects, a non-existent topic.

I say this, however, with diffidence and shall make due qualification in a moment. With diffidence, because no one can be sure of a general negative. I can say that I have found no evidence of civil-military relations over a wide area; but I cannot say that, in my researches, I have exhausted all the nooks and crannies where such evidence might be found, and I cannot say that no civil-military relations existed even though no evidence for them remained anywhere today. Who can be sure that Captain A. S. Crowninshield, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and Assistant Secretary of State William Rufus Day, meeting perhaps on the golf-course in Arlington of a Sunday morning, did not discuss the political and military situation in the Pacific? On the historical record, however, they did not.

This diffidently advanced negative applies to relations between the military services or

the service departments and the Department of State. Obviously it could not apply to the position in which the top military commanders stood with respect to the civilian service Secretaries and the civilian President. But it apparently came almost as near to applying, even here, as our Constitution would allow. The case in point is Commodore Dewey's famous attack on the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay, with its momentous and unhappy consequences, political and military, for the position of the United States in the Far East. I say "unhappy" consequences, because the attack left us with the Philippine orphan on our hands, and our consequent commitment for its defense has kept us strategically over-extended in the Far East ever since.

Who planned the attack that brought this about? Who studied its political implications? Who was consulted?

For many decades we had maintained a small naval squadron in the Western Pacific, apparently to support our commerce and "show the flag." Commodore Dewey's predecessor in command of that squadron could not have ignored the fact that war with Spain was an imminent possibility. He also knew, surely, that the Philippine Islands existed and that a Spanish naval squadron was at hand to defend them. Thus, although Secretary of the Navy John Davis Long was less than reliable on some points when he came to composing his memoirs, he was at least plausible when he stated that Dewey's predecessor had made plans for an attack on the Spanish forces in the Philippines, and that he turned those plans over to Dewey with his command.⁴ Such action by a naval officer in such a position is less noteworthy, perhaps, than would have been its omission.

Making plans which may or may not be called for is, however, not the same as mak-

³"Decision in Foreign Policy," *The Yale Review*, XLIV, 11. A more limited form of consultation at a subordinate level had already been developed before Gen. Marshall became Secretary of Defense. It was represented by the activities of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and of the National Security Council's "Senior Staff." But the full reality of continuous consultation at "the summit" did not come until 1950.

⁴John D. Long, *The New American Navy* (New York, 1903), I, 179.

ing policy. It was not within the authority of the Far Eastern commander to decide whether, in case war came, American forces should undertake any belligerent activities in the Western Pacific. That was for the civilian commander-in-chief, the President, to decide. But the President, together with his Secretary of the Navy, had no experience in the making of war and was, in any case, focusing his attention on Cuba, which was the only object of our quarrel with Spain.

In a real sense, no positive decision ever was taken to adopt a policy calling for an attack on the Philippines. The President merely found that this was the naval policy that the Navy had in mind, and he seems to have assumed that it must be right. "While we remained at war with Spain," Admiral Dewey later wrote, "our purpose must be to strike at the power of Spain wherever possible."⁵ This implication of unlimited war, which might have given a Bismarck pause, was unquestioned among us at the time. The *political* objective of the war was to liberate Cuba; but the *military* objective must be to hurt Spain wherever we could until she cried quits. The western Pacific was one of the principal places where we could hurt her. Given these tacit premises, the naval officers were right in assuming that we would strike at the Philippines in case of war. A special policy decision would have been needed rather to exempt them from the area of our military operations than to include them.

I see no evidence that President McKinley or Secretary Long gave much thought to the policy problems involved, or gave any thought at all to the matter on their own initiative. The Navy Department made preparations for the attack at a subordinate level and almost as a matter of routine. And if there were political implications in such an attack to be considered before ordering it, that was

hardly the business of the Navy. The President would be the one to decide that, with the advice of his Secretary of State if he wanted it. But no one raised a question, and no one knew of any question that might be raised.

Too much has sometimes been made, I think, of the role played by our energetic young Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. The attack on the Philippines has been represented as an extraordinary conception of his imagination for the realization of which he conspired against his own chiefs, Secretary Long and President McKinley. Surely, however, he was not being original when he included operations against the Philippines among the actions that he recommended to the Secretary of the Navy for the contingency of a war with Spain.⁶ And his support of Dewey for the command of the Asiatic squadron, on the grounds that Dewey was a competent and aggressive officer, hardly involved more conspiracy than is the daily fare of office-politics in Washington. There is nothing inately sinister about wanting an outstanding man in command of a squadron that is likely to see action. If the job was to be done it made sense to get hold of the man who could do it best. And no one questioned that the job should be done.

Certainly Roosevelt did go too far on the famous occasion when old Mr. Long gave himself a day off—February 25. Then Roosevelt acted like any willful and enthusiastic youngster who finds himself in sole command for the first time, issuing all sorts of dynamic and rather silly orders over his own signature as Acting Secretary of the Navy. One of these was the order instructing Dewey that, in the event of war, his duty would be "to see that the Spanish squadron does not

⁵George Dewey, *Autobiography* (New York, 1913) p. 239.

⁶See Roosevelt to Long, Sept. 20, 1897, in *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, 1951), I, 683.

leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands."⁷ Mr. Long was astonished and dismayed upon his return to discover all the things, sensible and unsensible, that Roosevelt had done in his brief absence. He felt it necessary to tell his young subordinate, *inter-alia*, that the instruction to Dewey should not have been sent without consulting him or the President.⁸ But he allowed the instruction to stand, so we may suppose that he did not disagree with it. Not the action, but the procedure in taking it, was what he objected to.

Finally, when war had begun, President McKinley approved the order for Dewey to strike at the Spanish fleet in Manila.⁹ The degree to which he or anyone else in Washington was putting himself in command of events, however, is indicated by the fact that action to draft and send the order was undertaken only in response to an urgent cable from Dewey, reporting that the British declaration of neutrality forced him to leave Hong Kong immediately and requesting instructions. While the order sent in reply was approved in the presence of Assistant Secretary of State Day (who was about to become Secretary), apparently the only question that ever arose had to do with the precise form of words to be used.

The simple fact appears to be that no one, military or civilian, saw any part of the vast political implications in this action. This is attested by the surprise of everyone concerned when the political consequences did immediately follow, consequences that left us vir-

tually no choice but to assume the strategic liability of having to discipline and defend a colonial possession that we did not want.¹⁰

I venture to include among those who were surprised by the political consequences such leaders of the "expansionist" school as Captain Mahan and Roosevelt himself. So far from having plotted for us to acquire the Philippines, Roosevelt appears to have been slow in coming to the conclusion that, having ousted Spain, we should make them our own. Writing privately to his fellow expansionist, Senator Lodge, on May 25, almost a month after the event, he expressed the hope "that peace will only be made on consideration of Cuba being independent, Porto Rico ours, and the Philippines taken away from Spain."¹¹ When he did accept the conclusion which others had reached before him, that we had to keep the Philippines, it was on the basis of a duty which, as he saw it, had been imposed upon us by an unanticipated destiny. In a few years he was to find this predestined duty so onerous that he would be ready to have us seek any honorable way out.¹²

The main reason, then, why civil-military relations, as we understand them, were not organized to deal responsibly with the conduct of our Pacific campaign in 1898 is that no one in authority saw any problem until it was too late. The conduct of naval operations was the business of the Navy, just as the conduct of diplomatic negotiations was the business of the Department of State. The hyphenated term "politico-military" had not entered our thinking except in the realm

⁷"Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, 1898" (Washington, 1898), p. 65.

⁸See Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit* (Boston, 1931), p. 112. (Millis does not give his source, and I have not found this information in the Long papers or elsewhere.)

⁹A controversy later arose over the circumstances in which the order was prepared. See letter from A. S. Crowninshield to Long, July 3, 1901, *Papers of John Davis Long*, Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, Vol. 78, 1939, p. 379; and Long, *The New American Navy*, New York, 1903, I, 181-182.

¹⁰A convincing argument can be made that by the time war had broken out it was already too late, if only for domestic political reasons, to hold our Asiatic squadron in check, even though the consequences of not holding it in check had been foreseen. My only point here is that we were, in fact, walking blind.

¹¹*Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge* (New York, 1925), I, 301.

¹²See A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far-eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938), p. 35.

of grand theory, divorced from particular operations, where Captain Mahan was most at home.

* * *

Note, now, the utility of studying history critically, as a philosopher might study it. With the war over and the Philippines on our hands, the strategy and conduct of the war became a matter of the historical record. That is to say, it was added to the record of experience from which human wisdom is drawn. We Americans, especially, were enriched by one more lesson in the great Book of Lessons.

Ideally, being a nation of unexcelled historians and philosophers, we would immediately have read that lesson aright. We would have noted that military actions, although taken only with military ends in view, may entail large political consequences. It would then have been evident to us that, in the future, we must always take possible political consequences into account in making choice among alternative courses of military action. Since the taking of such account would transcend the competence of the military, it would have followed, in our thinking, that the competent civil authorities must participate responsibly in the future planning of military strategy. Ideally, being the nation of historians and philosophers that I have imagined, we would have recognized at the conclusion of the Spanish war that our government had defaulted in not making provision for civil-military relations that required this kind of civilian participation. And we would immediately have repaired the fault by setting up, perhaps, a National Security Council and arrangements for liaison between the military chiefs-of-staff, the service Secretaries, and the Secretary of State.

Not all of us, however, then as now, were

historians and philosophers, and those who were lacked the "special point of view"—being creatures of their own times, unfortunately, rather than of our times. The most general reaction among our leaders was to unload the whole responsibility for what happened onto the shoulders of Destiny. In a later decade, after the first world war but before the second, it appeared that Destiny should no longer be made to bear the onus. It was placed, instead, on Roosevelt, Lodge, and Mahan, who were charged with having engaged in a deliberate conspiracy to lead our nation blindfold up the path of imperialism until it was too late for it to turn back.

While the years rolled by and the lesson remained unlearned we experienced other wars which left, as an historical residue, similar lessons. These tended to accumulate in our consciousness, gradually increasing our sophistication by their sheer weight, until that happy if belated ending of this particular tale which Mr. Acheson has supplied in his reference to the establishment for the first time in 1950 of relations between our Secretary of State and our military authorities for the "continuous discussion and development of policy." (Even as I note this "happy ending" I must add, parenthetically, my awareness of the fact that, unlike fiction, history has no endings. What we hold as final now will have to be rewritten later. No historian, so far, has ever got beyond the semi-finals.)

In some respects, the record of civilized mankind appears as a race between historical disasters, on the one hand, and historical lessons learned on the other. We have suffered a number of disasters since 1898, and now in the second half of the twentieth century we have, I think, learned a lesson.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR ARM

BY EDWIN L. WILLIAMS, JR.*

The air arm of the United States originated as a minor activity of the Signal Corps of the United States Army on 1 August 1907, when the Aeronautical Division, consisting of one officer and two enlisted men, was established in the office of the Army's Chief Signal Officer.¹ The Aeronautical Division's first airplane was received from the Wright brothers on 2 August 1909, the contract for the purchase of a plane having been signed on 10 February 1908.²

Between 1909 and 1911 no funds were appropriated by Congress for aviation purposes. Prior to 1911 the only statutory reference to aerial activity on the part of the U.S. Army was to be found in the appropriations for the Signal Corps under the heading "war balloons." The first direct statutory reference to aircraft was contained in the Appropriations Act of March 3, 1911, which read as follows:

For Expenses of the Signal Service of the Army . . . War balloons and airplanes, including their maintenance and repair; . . . Provided, however, that no more than \$100,000 of said amount shall be used for the purchase, maintenance and repair of airplanes and other aerial machines.³

**Editor's Note:* This article is the introductory chapter of USAF Historical Studies No. 84, *Legislative History of the AAF and USAF 1941-1951*, produced by Dr. Williams of the USAF Historical Division, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. This study affords a comprehensive picture of the development of the air arm from its administrative origin, through successive legislative enactments, into the autonomous Air Force of World War II.

¹Fred Hamlin and Arthur Clawson, et al, eds., *The Aircraft Yearbook for 1951* (Washington, 1952) [hereinafter cited *Aircraft Yearbook*, 1951, etc.] p. 371.

²United States Armed Forces Information School, *The Army Almanac, A Book of Facts Concerning the United States* (Washington, 1950) [hereinafter cited *The Army Almanac*], p. 211.

³36 U. S. Statutes at Large, 1938 [hereinafter cited 36 Stat. 1038, etc.]. See also Maj. Guido R. Perera,

In 1913 Congress appropriated \$125,000 for army aviation and provided for the detail of 30 officers to the aviation service of the Signal Corps. These officers were to receive a pay increase of 35 per cent.⁴ This year also saw the first legislative attempt to change the status of the air service to one of greater autonomy. Congressman James Hay, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, introduced a bill proposing to replace the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps with an Aviation Corps, which would be a part of the line of the Army. This measure was too far ahead of its time, however, and never emerged from the Committee on Military Affairs.⁵

Nevertheless, this, and other bills designed to give the Aeronautical Division the same status as the Signal Corps, resulted in an act of Congress, dated 18 July 1914, which established an Aviation Section within, and subordinate to, the Army Signal Corps. Also an appropriation of \$600,000, an unprecedented sum at that time, was earmarked for aeronautical development—probably because of the threat of war in Europe.⁶

The Aviation Section, as set up under this act, was given the function of operating or supervising the operation of all military aircraft and of training officers and enlisted men in military aviation. It was to consist of 60 officers and 260 enlisted men and a number of Signal Corps men assigned

"Legislative History of Aviation in the United States and Abroad" [hereinafter cited Perera, *Legislative History*], pp. 1-2.

⁴37 Stat. 705.

⁵R. Earl McClendon, *The Question of Autonomy for the United States Air Arm, 1907-1945*, AU Doc. Res. Study [hereinafter cited McClendon, *Autonomy for the Air Arm*], Part I, pp. 28-31.

⁶*The Army Almanac*, p. 211.

at large to administrative and technical duties. Provision was made for 60 aviation cadets to be selected from unmarried lieutenants of the line under 30 years of age. Qualifications for pilots were set up and special pay inducements were offered for flying personnel. All personnel engaging in frequent aerial flights were to receive a pay increase ranging from 25 to 75 per cent of their base pay. First and second lieutenants in the Aviation Section were to receive the pay of a grade higher than that of their regular rank. A death benefit totaling one year's pay was to be awarded to the designated beneficiary of any flyer killed in an aircraft accident. This act was the basic legislation for the operation of the air arm during the next several years.⁷ It is interesting to note that the legislation of 1913 and 1914 set the precedent for future grants of extra pay and death benefits for flying personnel.

The first legislative reference to civil aviation in the United States was the Act of March 3, 1915 by which a National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) was created.⁸ Made up of members representing the War and Navy Departments, the Smithsonian Institution, the Bureau of Standards, and of civilian members skilled in aeronautical affairs, the NACA had as its primary function the supervision and direction of scientific studies, research, and experiments in matters concerning aeronautics and the problems of flight.⁹ Although the NACA was not a military organization, it performed useful services for military aviation in analyzing the problems of aircraft construction and operation, and by assisting in plans for the production and testing of aircraft and the training of aviators.

The National Defense Act of June 3, 1916 contained several provisions directly concerning military aviation. It provided that the officer personnel of the Aviation Section should consist of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 8 majors, 24 captains, and 114 lieutenants, all of whom were to be qualified to serve as military aviators and detailed to serve as aviation officers for 4-year periods. Military aviators of rank not higher than that of captain were to receive the pay and allowances of a grade higher than their regular commission and flying pay ranging from 25 to 75 per cent of their base pay, if they were required to participate regularly and frequently in military flights. All previous restrictions as to marriage and age were removed.¹⁰

On 29 August 1916 Congress, taking cognizance of the increasing importance of military aviation, appropriated \$13,881,666 for the Army Aviation Section. In addition to the usual provisions of an appropriation act, the measure provided money for the training of reserve officers and enlisted men and for the development of an improved aviation engine.¹¹

The year 1916 also saw the introduction in Congress of the first of a long series of bills designed to create a Department of Aviation. This bill, introduced by Congressman Charles Lieb of Indiana, proposed to set up a separate executive department headed by a Secretary of Aviation, who should be a regular member of the President's cabinet. The department was to have under its jurisdiction the supervision and promotion of all aviation relating to the Army and Navy, as well as the expansion of commercial aviation in the public interest. This measure received little support

⁷38 Stat. 514-15. See also Perera, *Legislative History*, p. 88.

⁸Perera, *Legislative History*, p. 88.

⁹38 Stat. 930.

¹⁰39 Stat. 174.

¹¹39 Stat. 622.

and was never reported out of the House Committee on Military Affairs.¹²

America's entrance into World War I brought about a great expansion of the Army's air arm and resulted in much legislation concerning military aviation. On 16 May 1917 an Air Board was created on the recommendation of the Council of National Defense. This board, made up of military and civilian members, was to consider quantity production of aircraft, to coordinate the demands of the Army and Navy, and to establish schools and training fields. Since the board's effectiveness was limited by the fact that it had neither legal status nor executive powers, it was superseded by the Aircraft Board provided for in an act of October 1, 1917. Under the provisions of this act the Aircraft Board was to expand and coordinate aircraft production, and to supervise and direct the purchase and production of aircraft. The Board's major achievement was the development of the "Liberty Motor."¹³

The aviation act of July 24, 1917, passed by Congress following a great wave of public enthusiasm over the idea of overwhelming Germany with "a cloud of planes," made a huge appropriation of \$640,000,000 to be used in building up a great Army air arm. But it was discovered that enthusiasm, manpower, and raw material were not enough to build up tremendous air power in the space of a few months. When the United States entered World War I the Army air arm could muster only 225 planes, and not a one of these was a combat model by European standards. Of the 2,925 planes which reached the AEF's Zone of Advance during the war only 696 were of American make. The war was over before the Ameri-

can aircraft factories really got into full production.

Neither the military nor the civilian organization of American air power was adequate for fighting a large scale war. The Army air arm was merely a section of the Signal Corps, and the Aircraft Board actually had little power to coordinate and foster the development of air power. The result was that the air power program got off to a late start and accomplished little.¹⁴

Before the war was over Congressional dissatisfaction with the meager results attending so great an expenditure of money led to two investigations into aviation affairs, one by the Senate and the other by Mr. Justice Hughes acting in conjunction with the Department of Justice. While the findings produced no evidence of fraud, there was much to criticize in the handling of aircraft production.¹⁵

As a consequence Congress passed the Overman Act of May 20, 1918. This act gave the President the authority to establish an executive agency to exercise jurisdiction and control over the production of airplanes, engines, and airplane equipment, as well as broad powers to coordinate and consolidate the various executive agencies concerned with the conduct of the war. Acting under this authority, President Wilson, by Executive Order 2862, dated 20 May 1918, removed Army aviation from the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps and made a sweeping reorganization. The Division of Military Aeronautics, headed by a military director appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, took over the training and operations of the air arm. The Bureau of Aircraft Production, headed by a civilian director, was created and given complete

¹²McClendon, *Autonomy for the Air Arm*, I, 48. See also *Congressional Record*, 76 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 5054 (28 Mar. 1918).

¹³Perera, *Legislative History*, pp. 16-18.

¹⁴40 Stat. 243; W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, I, (Chicago, 1948), [hereinafter cited Craven and Cate, *The AAF in World War II*, I, etc.], 6-7.

¹⁵Perera, *Legislative History*, p. 18.

jurisdiction over the production of aircraft and aircraft engines and equipment. This bureau was connected with the Aircraft Board through interlocking membership. aviation agencies, Mr. John D. Ryan, the civilian head of the Bureau of Aircraft Production, was appointed Director of the Air Service and Second Assistant Secretary of War [for Air]. Although this appeared to be a move in the direction of separate cabinet representation for the air arm, it turned out to be only a wartime innovation.¹⁶

The establishment of the Air Service by executive order was recognized by Congress in the Appropriation Act of July 11, 1919, which listed the Air Service as one of the several Army organizations existing on 11 November 1918 which were to be kept in an active status until 30 June 1920.¹⁷ The Air Service was first incorporated under statutory law by Section 13a of the Army Reorganization Act of June 4, 1920, which gave formal recognition to the Air Service as a combatant arm and raised the authorized personnel strength of the air arm to its highest peacetime level (1,516 officers and 16,000 enlisted men including not over 2,500 flying cadets). There was to be a Chief of the Air Service with the rank of major general and an assistant with the rank of brigadier general. Ninety per cent of the officers in each grade below that of brigadier general were required to qualify as aircraft pilots or observers within one year after their assignment to the Air Service.¹⁸

The Appropriation Act of June 5, 1920 defined the respective spheres of operation for the Army and Navy air arms by providing that:

... The Army Air Service shall control all aerial operations from land bases and

naval aviation shall have control of all aerial operations attached to a fleet, including shore stations whose maintenance is necessary for operations connected with the fleet for construction and experimentation and for training of personnel.¹⁹

This did not, of course, permanently settle this jurisdictional question; it was destined to bring about differences of opinion between the military and naval air arms.

A strong sentiment for an independent air force had grown up among Air Service officers during World War I. There were also advocates of a separate air force in Congress and eventually a large public following was built up.²⁰ A total of eight measures proposing an independent or an autonomous air force was introduced in Congress in the 15 months immediately following the armistice. Nothing came of these bills, but the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 gave statutory recognition to the Air Service and made it a regular combatant arm of the Army, though it did not change the existing relationship between the Air Service and the General Staff. The Act really nullified progress toward separate cabinet status for the air arm by abolishing the office of Assistant Secretary of War [for Air] and many aviators considered it a definite setback for Air Service aspirations. It marked the victory of the old order in military circles over the proponents of a separate air force.²¹

The leader of the fight for an independent air force was Brig. Gen William Mitchell, Assistant Chief of the Air Service from 1919 to 1925. Mitchell's views on the importance of air power in modern warfare were not shared by his superiors in the Army, but he campaigned with unquench-

¹⁶1941 Stat. 953.

²⁰Craven and Cate. *The AAF in World War II*, I, 21-22.

²¹McClendon, *Autonomy for the Air Arm*, I, 84-85, 99-100; Craven and Cate, *The AAF in World War II*, I, 24.

¹⁶Perera, *Legislative History*, pp 18-20; Craven and Cate. *The AAF in World War II*, I, p. 9.

¹⁷41 Stat. 129.

¹⁸41 Stat. 768.

able zeal for a strong, independent air force. Mitchell appeared before congressional committees and special aircraft boards, engaged in lecture tours, and wrote books in order to bring home to the public the importance of air power.

Mitchell's doctrines were also largely responsible for the heated debate between the Army Air Service and the Navy over the question of the effectiveness of aerial bombardment of naval vessels. To demonstrate the power of aerial bombardment, obsolete American battleships and some captured German naval vessels were used as bomb targets by Army Air Service planes in a series of tests made off the Atlantic Coast. These tests proved conclusively, to Mitchell at least, that battleships were vulnerable to aerial attack.²² The publication of Mitchell's report on the sinking of the captured German battleship *Ostfriesland* in one of the bombing tests raised a tremendous furor. This report, supposedly safely pigeonholed, tore the official report of the Joint Army and Navy Board to pieces and blasted the claims of the admirals that the bombing tests had proved nothing and that battleships would still remain the greatest factor in naval strength. As a result, General Menoher, Director of the Air Service, resigned; and the Senate passed a resolution calling on the Secretary of War to submit General Mitchell's report to that body. Acting on the President's instructions, the Secretary of War refused to submit the report. Despite criticism, this report was never officially released.²³

General Mitchell's continued crusade in favor of airpower, and his outspoken criticism of those who were opposed to its de-

velopment, brought about his dismissal as Assistant Chief of the Air Service, and eventually a court-martial in 1925. By sentence of the court martial he was suspended from rank, command, and duty, with a forfeiture of all pay and allowances for five years. Soon afterward he resigned his commission but kept up his fight for air power.

Mitchell's crusade for a separate air force, and his "martyrdom," had a great impact on public opinion. The numerous Mitchell headlines in the newspapers tended to swell the mailbags of members of Congress and to produce flurries of "Mitchell Resolutions." Most of these resolutions died in committee, but they served as a nucleus for subsequent important legislation.²⁴

Such legislation was to be long delayed, however. The older officers of the Army and Navy did not share the view of the Air Service flying officers whose experience in World War I had convinced them that warfare in the future would be increasingly dependent on air power, and that air power was a striking arm which should constitute a third branch of our military establishment on an equal status with the land and sea branches. High-ranking dignitaries, including the heads of the War and Navy Departments, members of the General Staff, and others in responsible positions of leadership, regarded aviation simply as an auxiliary to Army and Navy operations, not as a separate element of the military establishment. As they wished to keep aviation in a subordinate or auxiliary role, they opposed any movement to increase the position, power, or prestige of the air arm.²⁵ Occupying positions of dominance and control, this group had a great advantage over the protagonists of air power and were long successful in keeping it in a subordinate role despite consider-

²²McClendon, *Autonomy for the Air Arm*, I, 102-3.

²³John W. Mulkin, "A Legislative History of the Struggle of the Air Force for Independent Status" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, June 1952) [hereinafter cited as Mulkin, *Air Force Struggle*], pp. 41-44.

²⁴McClendon, *Autonomy for the Air Arm*, I, 104-5.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 72.

able public and congressional sentiment in favor of building up a strong air arm with independent status, or at least one with a large degree of autonomy.

In the interval between the two World Wars a total of well over 50 measures proposing either to organize the air arm as a separate executive department of aviation or to make it one of three coordinate branches (Army, Navy, and Air) in a department of national defense were introduced in Congress. There were also numerous investigations, studies, and reports made by congressional committees, and by executive and Army boards, on the subject of air power and the best way to use it in our defense system. No action resulted, however, as those in authority, especially the War Department General Staff, stoutly resisted all such proposals until very near the end of the period.²⁶

Although legislative proposals for a separate air arm failed of enactment, Congress did pass legislation recognizing the increasing military importance of air power. After the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 the next important piece of aviation legislation was the Air Corps Act of July 2, 1926. This act changed the name Air Service to Air Corps and emphasized the role of that service in maintaining an air force, with great potential striking power rather than for the performance of auxiliary services for other branches of the Army. As in the Air Service, the Chief of the Air Corps was to have the rank of major general, and there were to be three assistant chiefs with the rank of brigadier general. The chief, two of his assistants, and at least 90 per cent of the officers in each grade were to be flying officers (qualified pilots). Flying units were in all cases to be commanded by flying

officers. The regular personnel strength of the Air Corps was to be the same as that established for the Air Service by the Army Reorganization Act of 1920.

Various other provisions concerning personnel were made. It was specified that officers of the Air Corps could be given temporary rank in accordance with their duties and responsibilities, provided that this temporary rank was not more than two grades above their permanent rank. In time of peace 20 per cent of the total number of pilots employed in tactical units were to be enlisted men. The Secretary of War was directed to investigate and study the "alleged injustices" existing in the Army promotion list, and to report to Congress thereon. Flying pay, amounting to 50 per cent of their regular pay, was to be received by all officers and enlisted men of the Air Corps, as well as of the other services, when their duties required them "to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights."

Greater recognition of air power's increasing importance in national defense was shown by the fact that, under this act, the Air Corps was given staff representation through a provision that an air section headed by an Air Corps officer should be set up in each division of the War Department General Staff. Also the position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air was reestablished (this position had been abolished by the Army Reorganization Act of June 4, 1920).

The Air Corps Act also made provisions for an Air Corps expansion program by authorizing increases in personnel and equipment, to be distributed over a five-year period. Under this program, the allotment of officers (1,516) to the Air Corps could be increased by 403 officers distributed in grades from colonel to second lieutenant, and the allotment of enlisted personnel (16,000) by 6,240 men. The act also

²⁶R. Earl McClendon, *Unification of the Armed Forces: Administrative and Legislative Developments, 1945-1949* [hereinafter cited as McClendon, *Unification*], p. 2.

authorized the President to call up for active duty a maximum of 450 air Corps Reserve Officers as needed.

The five-year program also provided for an increase of planes to a strength not exceeding 1,800 serviceable airplanes, as many airships and balloons as the Secretary of War considered necessary for training purposes, and the spare parts, equipment, supplies, hangars, and installations necessary for their supply and maintenance. But, as will be seen, this expansion program was not implemented by adequate appropriations, and at the end of the five years the Air Corps was still lagging far behind its authorized strength in airplanes and equipment.

Finally, the Air Corps Act contained provisions for the procurement of aircraft by a system of advertising for competitive bids. Provisions were also made concerning the letting of contracts and establishing the necessary qualifications for contractors handling aircraft for the Army and Navy. A Patents and Designs Board was established to evaluate designs for aircraft, and for aircraft parts and accessories, which might be submitted to it by individuals or corporations. Acting with the advice of the NACA, this board was to determine whether or not such items should be purchased (at a cost of not over \$75,000) and used by the government.²⁷

The Air Corps Act did not actually represent as great an advance in the status of the Army air arm as it seemed. It was not a move toward autonomy, for the Air Corps and its budget remained under the control of the War Department. Funds were not made available for the authorized five-year expansion program—although the War De-

partment and the Bureau of the Budget, more than Congress, seem to have been responsible for this reluctance to grant sufficient funds. Directed reforms were not carried out to the satisfaction of the officers concerned, and the token representation accorded the Air Corps on the General Staff availed little.²⁸ By 1933 the office of the Second Assistant Secretary of War [for Air] was vacant and its functions had been redistributed.²⁹

For several years after the passage of the Air Corps Act, Congress took little action in affairs relating to military aviation other than to make certain routine appropriations. For seven years, beginning in 1927, Congress enacted no legislation concerning the administration of military aviation.

Although the Air Corps made considerable progress in these years, it did not carry out the five-year program authorized by Congress in 1926. Year after year the War Department and the Bureau of the Budget scaled down the appropriations requested by the Air Corps before the budgets were submitted to Congress; the funds to implement the 1926 program never were made available. As late as 30 June 1937, although more than a decade had elapsed since Congress had authorized a force of 1,800 serviceable airplanes for the Air Corps, the air arm actually had only 842 such aircraft on hand.³⁰

When Franklin Delano Roosevelt became President in 1933 the advocates of air power

²⁸Craven and Cate, *The AAF in World War II*, I, 29. The Air Corps Act in its main provisions leaned heavily on the recommendations of the Morrow Board appointed by President Coolidge, himself an opponent of an independent air force. Its report was a vindication of the *status quo*.

²⁹Perera, *Legislative History*, pp. 54-55.

²⁷41 Stat. 780. It should also be mentioned that the Air Corps Act authorized the presentation of the soldiers' medal and the distinguished flying cross to military personnel.

³⁰AHS-22 (Revised), *Legislation Relating to the AAF Materiel Program 1939-1945*, p. 1; see also Appendix I, *Appropriation for Army Air Corps for fiscal Years, 1926-1939*, for examples showing how Air Corps requests for funds were pared down.

received a powerful ally.³¹ But before the Air Corps was able to profit from a sympathetic hearing of its cause in the White House, it passed through an ordeal in the winter of 1933-34 which centered public attention on the Air Corps and its problems.

The Postmaster General revoked the 1933 air mail contracts after investigations revealed that they were the result of fraud and collusion and thereby illegal. The President then ordered the Air Corps to take up the unfamiliar task of carrying the air mail. The Air Corps was confronted with the problem of flying a scheduled transport service without proper equipment, with an inadequate ground organization, and in the face of extremely bad flying weather.

Disaster was the result: accidents followed one another in rapid succession, and by the end of the first 3 weeks 10 men had died while attempting to carry the mail in Air Corps planes.³² In the spring of 1934 Congress passed an act, approved 27 March 1934, which gave the Air Corps statutory authority to use Air Corps planes for carrying the mail; the act included the proviso that the pilots carrying the mails were to be fully trained in the use of the special equipment necessary for night flying.³³ This action was somewhat like locking the barn door after the horse had been stolen. Meanwhile, because of the accidents, the Air Corps was subjected to a barrage of criticism by the press. Air Corps personnel felt that they had been unjustly criticized.³⁴

The winter of 1934, disastrous though it was to the Air Corps, was the turning point

in its struggle for more equipment, more personnel, greater recognition of its basic mission, and more freedom of action. Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr, who had been a lieutenant colonel in charge of the procurement and maintenance of the Army mail planes at the time of the air mail episode, said later:

... except for this experience the Air Force would have been caught even shorter when the war [World War II] began. During the weeks we carried the mail, we had more money for necessary equipment than in all our previous history combined. Our crews obtained invaluable training. The Baker Board and the Howell Commission were appointed to investigate the Air Corps, and the General Headquarters Air Force was the outcome of their recommendations.³⁵

Already on 12 October 1933 the Drum Board, after reviewing a series of War Department and Air Corps studies, had recommended the creation of a General Headquarters Air Force with 1,800 planes.³⁶ The Baker Board was appointed by order of the Secretary of War on 17 April 1934 as a War Department special committee on the Air Corps. It was to make a constructive study of the operation, flying equipment, and training of the Air Corps, and to determine its fitness to perform its missions in peace and war. When the Baker Board had completed its study, it submitted a report which stressed the principle of unity of command and disapproved the separation of the air arm from the Army as violating that principle. This report denied the vulnerability of the United States to air invasion and did not support the air officers in their request for a separate promotion list, a separate budget, and a separate staff. The Baker re-

³¹McClendon, *Autonomy for the Air Arm*, II, 151. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during Wilson's administration, Mr. Roosevelt had been a pioneer in the development of naval aviation. He was the first flying Chief Executive.

³²AHS-25, *Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907-1935* (Congressional and War Department Action), p. 92.

³³48 Stat. 508.

³⁴AHS-25, p. 92.

³⁵William Bradford Huie, *The Case Against the Admirals, Why We Must Have a Unified Command* (New York, 1946), 25. Hereinafter cited as Huie, *The Case Against The Admirals*.

³⁶Craven and Cate, *The AAF in World War II*, I, 30.

port did, however, make an important concession to airmen in recognizing the need for a tactical air force trained and organized as a homogeneous unit to operate in close cooperation with the ground forces or to act independently. It therefore recommended a division of functions within the Air Corps; in the reorganization the combat force would be organized as a GHQ Air Force under a general directly responsible to the General Staff and supply and training functions would remain under the control of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps.³⁷

The second commission to be set up as a result of the air mail episode was the Federal Aviation Commission, known as the Howell Commission, after its chairman Clark Howell, editor of the *Atlanta Constitution*. This commission was the result of legislative action, being provided for under the Air Mail Act of June 12, 1934.³⁸ In its report this committee did not comment on the subject of an independent air force. Under ordinary circumstances the commission would have probably reported in favor of an autonomous air force, but it remained silent on this issue in order to give the new tactical air force, already recommended by the Baker Board, an opportunity for an adequate trial. The report of the Howell Commission did, however, favor acceptance of the new concept of air power as a major arm rather than a mere auxiliary, thus giving encouragement to the advocates of an offensive air arm.³⁹

Meanwhile the War Department had reorganized the Air Corps and on 1 March 1935 had established the GHQ Air Force.

³⁷AHS-25, pp. 93-94. Apparently the proposal of the Baker Board for a reorganization of the Air Force was intended to weaken the demand for an independent air force—see McClendon, *Autonomy for the Air Arm*, II, 163.

³⁸Stat. 936-38.

³⁹AHS-25, pp. 97-98.

This reorganization followed the general pattern recommended in the Baker report. All the combat units of the Air Corps were consolidated into the GHQ Air Force under the control of a commanding general who was subject only to the General Staff. Supply and training functions remained under the control of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC), also responsible to the General Staff. The commanding general of the GHQ Air Force was responsible to the Chief of Staff in peacetime and to the theater commanders in time of war. The commanding general of the GHQ Air Force had complete control over the tactical air units as such, but the corps area commanders of the Army retained administrative control over Air Corps personnel at bases where the tactical units were stationed. Obviously this reorganization had certain undesirable features in that it created a divided command authority in the Army Air Corps, and also diminished the control of the commanding general of the GHQ Air Force over his personnel. Although falling far short of satisfying those who had demanded a separate air force, the establishment of a separate striking force under the new organization at least gave the Air Corps an opportunity to demonstrate the doctrine of offensive air power which General Mitchell and his followers had long advocated as a basic concept of modern military strategy.⁴⁰

Congress took cognizance of the new organization of the air arm in an act of August 12, 1935 which provided for the location of additional permanent Air Corps stations and depots in all the strategic areas of the United States, including Alaska and the overseas possessions. These stations were to be suitably located to form a nucleus for concentrations of the GHQ Air Force in

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 98-100.

war and to permit peacetime training in each of the strategic areas.⁴¹

On 16 June 1936 an act of Congress gave authority to the President to appoint from among permanent lieutenant colonels or colonels who were flying officers, a commanding general of the GHQ Air Force with the rank of major general and such wing commanders with the rank of brigadier general as might be necessary. It was also provided that up to 1,350 Air Corps Reserve officers might be called up, with their consent, for a five-year period of training. The act provided that pilots and observers should be designated as flying officers and authorized temporary promotion in the grades from major to colonel, inclusive, for such regular flying officers of the Air Corps as might be necessary to meet its administrative, tactical, technical, and training needs. A 5 per cent increase was authorized to meet additional needs of the War Department for Air Corps officers.⁴²

Another way in which the Air Corps profited from the air mail investigations was in the recommendation by the Baker Board for an additional 520 planes. This recommendation was followed by Congress on 24 June 1936, when it authorized an increase of the airplane strength of the Air Corps to 2,320 planes, 520 over the 1,800 authorized by the Air Corps Act of 1926. The act of June 24, 1936 also authorized purchase of equipment and accessories necessary to complement the increase in plane strength, with provisions for a 25 per cent reserve, in order to enable the Secretary of War to complete the organization of, and to maintain the GHQ Air Force and our overseas defenses.⁴³

It was during the period of the early and middle thirties that the Air Corps launched its long-range bomber program. The B-17

grew out of proposals distributed among manufacturers by the Air Corps in 1933 for a design competition to be held the following year. Boeing developed a four-engine bomber of revolutionary design, the VB-17 prototype of the B-17 (Flying Fortress) which successfully completed its first test flight in July 1935. The Air Corps recommended the purchase of 65 B-17's in place of 185 other aircraft which had been previously authorized for the fiscal year 1936. After an unfortunate accident destroyed the original model, the War Department reduced the number to be purchased to 13. By August 1937 these Flying Fortresses had been delivered to the Air Corps.

The fact that the dates of the activation of the bomber program and those of the activation and legislative implementation of the GHQ Air Force coincided closely suggests that the leaders of the Air Corps may well have accepted a compromise on the question of the organization of the air arm in the hope that this might clear the way for the acceptance of the long-cherished heavy bomber program. After 1935 the Air Corps was characterized not so much by its concern to change the basic organization of national defense as by a determination to find in the GHQ Air Force the basis for an ambitious program of bomber development. Thereafter most Army airmen were, above all else, advocates of the big bomber.⁴⁴ If air power was to be a major factor in warfare, and not merely an auxiliary to the ground service, the air arm had to proceed on the basis that its number one job was bombardment.

The tendency of high ranking Air Corps officers to give up advocacy of independence or autonomy for the air arm was partly due to a resigned acceptance of the status quo, and partly to a desire to allow time

⁴¹49 Stat. 610.

⁴²49 Stat. 1524.

⁴³AHS-22, p. 1; 49 Stat. 1907.

⁴⁴Craven and Cate, *The AAF in World War II*, I, 66-67.

for the GHQ Air Force to prove its merit. Although organizational changes gave the air arm a fair degree of autonomy by 1941, it was still under Army and War Department control. There was a general reluctance after the outbreak of World War II to commence any agitation for an independent air force for fear that it might interfere in some way with the current preparedness program.⁴⁵

Between 1935 and 1941 the defects of divided command within the air arm, and of limited control by the commanding officer of the GHQ Air Force over his personnel, led to much controversy within the Air Corps, and caused numerous investigations, which resulted in several minor changes in Air Corps organization. It finally became evident that such an organization was not in the best interests of the expansion program, and the Secretary of War in March 1941 directed that steps be taken to place the air arm under one responsible head and to permit a certain necessary degree of autonomy.

In conformity with the Secretary's instructions, a plan of reorganization was worked out. This reorganization, as set forth in AR 95-5 of 20 June 1941, created the Army Air Forces (AAF) to coordinate the activities of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, the Air Force Combat Command (formerly the GHQ Air Force), and minor units. Direct responsibility for aviation matters was vested in the Chief of the AAF, who was to be assisted in policy formulation by the Air Staff. The Chief of the Air Corps and the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command were under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the AAF and had immediate responsibility for service and combat matters respectively.⁴⁶ Al-

though this reorganization gave a greater degree of autonomy to the air arm, it did not solve the basic problems of unity of effort and delineation of responsibilities between the service and combat elements of the air arm. Still another reorganization of the air arm was being planned at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.⁴⁷

In the years immediately following the creation of the General Headquarters Air Force in 1935, Congress, too, seemed content with the existing air organization. Up to 1 March 1939 only two bills proposing a separate department of the air were introduced in Congress. Neither was reported from committee, and one of these was actually denounced by the Chief of the Air Corps. Within the same four-year period only five measures providing for a department of defense came up—four of these were buried in committee and the fifth was voted down in the House of Representatives by an overwhelming majority. There was even less congressional activity along these lines in the period from 1 March 1939 to 19 November 1940.

In the seven months following, however, a total of 15 bills designed to free the Air Corps from the control of the War Department was introduced in Congress. Although none of these proposed measures emerged from committee, their sponsors "plugged" for them at every opportunity.

The War Department remained firmly opposed to any further major changes in the organizational set-up of the air arm. Acting Secretary of War Robert Patterson declared that the existing status was satisfactory, and that at all events it was dangerous to incur the delay and the confusion incident to reorganization at a time when the U.S. was in danger of being drawn into

⁴⁵McClendon, *Autonomy for the Air Arm*, II, 196.

⁴⁶AHS-10 (Revised), *Organization of the Army Air Arm*, 1935-1945, pp. 4-14.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 14, 17.

the holocaust of World War II. Secretary of War Stimson was also opposed to any large-scale organizational changes in the air arm, feeling that the reorganization under AR 95-5 gave the air arm reasonable autonomy within the framework of the War Department and constituted a more modern and efficient system of creating air power than an independent air force would provide.⁴⁸

Although various members of Congress continued to show an interest in an independent air force and offered relevant measures during the war years, no really definitive legislation on this subject was enacted until 1947. Meanwhile, in the period 1935-1941, Congress enacted several measures which increased the personnel and materiel strength of the air arm. At first the legislation was mainly for the purpose of implementing the Army regulation establishing the GHQ Air Force. Later Congress, as a result of the outbreak of World War II in 1939, enacted legislation expanding the Army air arm as a part of the overall program of military preparedness.

The acts of August 12, 1935, June 16, 1936, and June 24, 1936, as previously outlined, implemented the establishment of the GHQ Air Force and authorized substantial increases in personnel and equipment for the Air Corps. The Act of June 24, 1936, in particular, authorized an Air Corps of 2,320 serviceable planes; this increase was designated specifically for the purpose of meeting the increased demands for personnel and equipment caused by the recent activation of the GHQ Air Force. Despite this legislation, however, the Air Corps was unable to secure the funds to purchase the planes and equipment necessary to bring the Air Corps up to the authorized strength. In planning to attain the 2,320-plane objective the Air

Corps submitted estimates of approximately \$100,000,000 for the fiscal year 1938, but the War Department Budget Advisory Committee reduced these estimates by about \$13,000,000 and the final appropriation by Congress was only slightly more than \$77,000,000.⁴⁹ It is interesting to observe that the final appropriation was about \$10,000,000 less than the final revised estimate of the Budget Advisory Committee, which was rather unusual as the cuts were generally made by the War Department and the Budget Bureau.

A study of the over-all picture of military appropriations in the thirties shows that while Congress was usually generous to the Air Corps, it must share with the Bureau of the Budget (representing the President) and the War Department the responsibility for the allocation to the Air Corps of insufficient funds to procure the planes and equipment necessary to bring it up to its authorized strength. During the thirties Congress was averse to increasing military appropriations beyond the President's budgets and was, on the whole, content to check the military estimates and to alter them only moderately.⁵⁰ Even so, presidential estimates for expansion of enlisted strength and military materiel tended to be less than appropriations. Although the President advocated a great increase in our air power in 1939, it was not until 1940, the critical year which saw the disastrous Battle of France and the threat of complete German victory in the west, that the President's military budget estimates began to be determined on the basis of the Army's actual needs and the capacity of the nation's industries to absorb appropriations.⁵¹

⁴⁹AHS-22, p. 1.

⁵⁰Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword, Control of the Army by Congress through Military appropriations, 1938-1950*, (Ithaca, N.Y., 1950) [hereinafter cited as Huzar, *Purse and Sword*], p. 147.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 143-147.

⁴⁸McClendon, *Autonomy for the Air Arm*, II, 205-13.

The progressive deterioration of the international situation and the gathering war clouds in Europe in 1939 finally brought Congress and the President to take action leading to a really substantial increase of American air power in recognition of its importance to national defense. The outbreak of World War II in September of 1939 soon justified the action of Congress and the President, and the spectacular victories won by the Nazis in the spring and summer of 1940 brought the threat of war even closer to the United States, making it apparent that a great additional build-up of air power was essential to national security. The demands of Britain and France and their allies for military aircraft greatly stimulated American aircraft production in 1940, a development which eventually contributed greatly to the expansion of American air power, although its immediate effect

was to create difficulties in carrying out the Air Corps expansion program by forcing the Air Corps, under the lend-lease program, to share with foreign buyers in the procurement of military aircraft. The German attack on the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941 and the extension of lend-lease to meet Soviet requirements for military aircraft added to these difficulties. Although this situation made it impossible for the Air Corps to meet the procurement requirements of its 54-group program of expansion (which called for a total delivery by 1 April 1942 of 21,470 tactical and training planes), the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 found our air arm at least able to survive and to begin, within less than a year, a limited offensive.⁵²

⁵²Craven and Cate, *The AAF in World War II*, II, 128, 150.

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THE CHARACTER OF HANS VON SEECKT

BY HAROLD J. GORDON, JR.*

The outward form of the German Army of the Weimar Republic was largely determined by the victorious Allies at Versailles. Its essential character, however, was set in "the mould of Seeckt." General von Seeckt, who was *Chef der Heeresleitung* (Chief of the Army Leadership) from June 1920 to October 1926, did not originate all of the policies which characterized the *Reichswehr*, but only those policies he supported survived to bear fruit in later years.

Throughout the formative years of the new Army this man controlled its destiny. In late 1923, as legal dictator, he even controlled the destiny of the German Republic. Yet even during the days of his greatest power and influence Seeckt was always an impersonal, if impressive, figure even to his fellow countrymen. The General was universally known; the man remained a shadow.

In view of the significance of Seeckt's activities and position and in view of the storm of controversy which has arisen concerning the *Reichswehr*, it would seem that a clearer picture of Seeckt as a human being is needed, if only to place him and his work in proper perspective.

General Johannes Friedrich Leopold von Seeckt was a strong and many-sided character, a man of contradictions and of restless energy. Lord D'Abernon, the British Ambassador in Berlin, once made an excellent thumb-nail sketch of Seeckt, saying: "A broader mind than is expected in so tight a

uniform, a wider outlook than seems appropriate in so precise, so correct, so neat an exterior."¹

Seeckt came of a Pomeranian family which was allegedly descended from a noble Magyar house. Most of Seeckt's ancestors had been pastors, merchants, lawyers and soldiers. His father was a prominent general. His branch of the family had been ennobled in the 18th century, but had since lost the ancestral estate, "Nepzin."²

Seeckt himself was a thorough-going aristocrat, strongly influenced by the ideas, ideals and prejudices of his class, although he over-rode them in serious matters if this seemed to be the proper course. He was one of those rare figures whose brain dictated to his heart, who went the lonely and unpopular way if he believed it to be the proper one. Also he was a man who saw beauty in simplicity as well as in sophistication. He enjoyed the life of a soldier on maneuvers, riding in the sun and wind and rain. He loved the color and movement of country town market-places and fields of flowers, just as he loved beautiful paintings and stately palaces. He combined respect for the honest, simple man with cold distaste for the mob. Beyond this, a strain of puritanism ran through his nature: a feeling that luxury and waste were bad taste in a land where so many were bitterly poor.³

¹D'Abernon, Viscount Edgar Vincent. *Ambassador of Peace*. 3 Volumes. London, 1929. II, p. 42. (Hereafter cited as D'Abernon, *Ambassador*.)

²Rabenau, General Friedrich v., ed. *Seeckt, Aus Meinem Leben*. Leipzig, 1941. pp. 13-20. *Deutsche Wille*, 15 April 1926. Görlitz, Walther. *Der deutsche Generalstab*. Frankfurt/Main, 1950. (Hereinafter cited as Görlitz, *Generalstab*.)

³Rabenau, General Friedrich v., ed. *Seeckt, Aus Meinem Leben*. Leipzig, 1941. *passim*. See, e.g., pp. 259, 278, 334-36. 322, 277. (Hereafter cited as Rabenau, *Seeckt*.)

**Editor's Note*: The Seeckt Papers, cited herein by the author are in microfilm copy in several academic institutions: the Harvard College Library, the University of Pennsylvania Library, the University of Wisconsin Library, and the Hoover Library in Stanford, California. The Gordon Papers refers to a private collection of some half a hundred letters from German Generals in the custody of Dr. Harold J. Gordon of the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Too, Seeckt was exceptionally literate and had strong artistic and scholarly interests. Even among General Staff Officers, many of whom had literary and scholarly tastes, Seeckt stood out because of his literary and artistic knowledge and sensitivity. Lieutenant-Colonel von Linstow, one of his personal adjutants—who was executed by the Nazis after the failure of the 20 July *coup d'état*—wrote: "His understanding of art, especially music, painting and architecture, is too well known for me to need to testify to it. He loved good literature and often sat and read in his library even after parties."⁴ The *Gymnasium* Professor who made out Seeckt's University Qualification Certificate said of him: "Von Seeckt is unusually well read in German literature and has a fine, deep understanding for the works themselves, which indeed makes itself apparent in the most fortunate manner—aesthetically speaking—in his very excellent compositions. . . ."⁵

The General's cultural and historical interests were not occasional playthings but an integral part of his life. Captain von Selchow, another adjutant, testifies that Seeckt never failed to visit an art gallery he was near and that he often lectured Selchow on the history of palaces and castles they visited or passed drawing vivid pictures of life as it had been led by those who built the castles or ruled from them.

Constant references in his letters show Seeckt attending symphony concerts, appraising paintings, strolling through the parks at Versailles, drinking wine with an Iron Cross-bearing Franciscan Abbot during a discussion of Aramaic, Persian and Hebrew bibles and early Christian mosaics. After his dismissal from office, he left immediately for Italy to see her Renaissance art, and his biographer's last encounter with the old gen-

eral, a month before his death, was at a theater. Whatever else Seeckt may have been, he was a well-rounded man intellectually.⁶

Although Seeckt was a man of culture and could, when he chose, exert a very considerable personal charm, he was notorious for an icy aloofness which only a few intimates could normally penetrate. Indeed, in his early days as Chief of the *Heeresleitung*, Seeckt annoyed several generals by his cold and haughty manner, until Major Köstring, his senior adjutant, prevailed upon him to unbend at least towards general officers.

Linstow, who was very close to Seeckt during his years as adjutant, believed that the General was really extremely shy and diffident with strangers and that this fact was the true secret of the "Sphinx":

" . . . I still remember well an exceptionally striking example. Maneuvers 1925 in Saxony; the region Annaberg, Freiberg. Great participation of the population, which visibly pleased him. We stood on a height. Policemen barred off the area with ropes. Many spectators were present, especially children, entire classes with their teachers. The General went very slowly, haltingly, up to the children. He smiled and was obviously pleased. He could have spoken to the children—and also certainly wished to speak to them—for a fraction of a second. Then it was as if a curtain passed across his face, which resumed its normal expression. He turned on his heel and acted as though nothing had happened. Köstring and I both felt that he had not known how to commence, and I believe that his cool reserve towards many people often had the same basis."⁷

Seeckt's abhorrence of publicity, the reluctance with which he performed many of the social functions of his office and his tendency

⁴Seeckt Papers, Stück 290, Testimony of Lt. Col. v. Linstow, II, p. 2.

⁵Seeckt Papers, Stück 1, *Zeugnis der Reife*.

⁶Rabenau, *Seeckt*, pp. 153, 164, 166, 173, 260-61, 263-64, 271-72, 335-36, 402, 414, 564, 727. Seeckt Papers, Stück 289, Testimony of Capt. v. Selchow, pp. 203, Stück 290, Letter: Hans-Wolf v. Goldhammer to Rabenau. Gordon Papers, II, Letter No. 6 (Köstring).

⁷Seeckt Papers, Stück 290, Testimony of Lt. Col. v. Linstow, II, pp. 1-2.

to lapse into sullen silence when crossed by equals all tend to confirm Linstow's analysis, as does an occasional almost childish maneuver apparently aimed at impressing his importance upon key political personalities. Whatever its cause, Seeckt's aloofness prevented him from ever becoming a truly popular figure in Germany and alienated many influential people, especially civilians. His icy coldness of manner also undoubtedly played a role in his eventual downfall, just as it helped to make him a legendary figure in his own lifetime.⁸

The General's sharp tongue and mordant wit also reduced his popularity and won him influential foes. Suffering neither fools nor extremists gladly, he lashed them with tongue or pen, sparing no politician, soldier or scholar whom he deemed to merit criticism. Thus he wrote to his wife of Oswald Spengler: "... I wished he had gone down with the West—a political fool."⁹ Of Ludendorff he wrote to General von Kraewel immediately after the Beer Hall Putsch: "... Yes, our friend L.! he indeed leads—as his faithful former Operations Officer (H. [offmann])¹⁰ said—the war of lost opportunities and this time will also allow the opportunity to shoot himself in the head to slip away."¹¹ Again, in 1924, when Admiral Tirpitz, having heard rumors that Seeckt was to be dismissed, came to him and said: "What can the German Nationalist People's Party do for you?" the General's reply was a curt "Nothing."¹²

Among friends and relatives, Seeckt was a different man, friendly, informal and gracious. He inspired an unwavering loyalty in

those who were closest to him. His various adjutants remained his friends and admirers for life. His wife, an able and talented woman, was devoted to Seeckt, as was his sister. His personal orderly, Perlbach, remained with the General when he left the service and was at his side when Seeckt died.¹³

Despite his shyness or coldness, Seeckt had a sense of humor and could—at times—even laugh at himself. In 1925 he wrote to his wife: "The *Kladderdatsch* has a wonderful picture of me. Since it is on the front page this time, perhaps you have already seen it—"the Sphinx!" I find it very amusing and very *à propos*."¹⁴ His letters also often reveal a quiet and gentle humor, quite at variance with the cutting wit he sometimes wielded so effectively. On one occasion he wrote, "It is warm in the house. Maxe, the dog, friendly. We get along well together, which displeases Perlbach."¹⁵ And on another: "It is terrible that I forgot Maxe's birthday. Give her the enclosed envelope, buy her a nice present to her own taste and excuse my absence from the celebration."¹⁶

Personally, Seeckt was warm-hearted and had a very serious interest in the welfare of the officers and men serving under him. He disliked hurting friends or colleagues in any way. Both his wife and his adjutant testify to his deep grief over an accident on the Weser in 1925 which cost the lives of seventy soldiers.¹⁷ Too, on more than one occasion he permitted his immediate subordinates to persuade him to ameliorate punishments which he had planned to mete out to insubordinate or disobedient senior

⁸Rabenau, *Seeckt*, pp. 179, 231, 264, 335, 402, 411. Seeckt Papers, Stück 281, Extract from Hasse Diary, ca. May, 1925; Stück 289, Testimony of Captain v. Selchow, pp. 1-2,9.

⁹Seeckt Papers, Box 33, p. 254.

¹⁰General Hoffmann detested General Ludendorff.

¹¹Seeckt Papers, Stück 88, Letter: Seeckt to General v. Kraewel, 12.11.1923.

¹²Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 410.

¹³Rabenau, *Seeckt*, *passim*. Seeckt Papers, Stück 291, Unsigned Diary Extracts (undoubtedly Frau v. Seeckt's); Stück 289, Testimony of Captain v. Selchow; Stück 290, Testimony of Lt. Col. v. Linstow. Gordon Papers, II, Letter No. 6 (Köstring).

¹⁴Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 418.

¹⁵*Ibid.* p. 392.

¹⁶*Ibid.* p. 141.

¹⁷*Ibid.* p. 414. Seeckt Papers, Stück 291, Unsigned Diary Extracts (Frau v. Seeckt).

officers.¹⁸ General Hasse, exasperated over a particular incident, once wrote: ". . . He is, indeed, not a man of strife. . . ." ¹⁹

Seeckt was devoted to his wife, writing to her almost daily when they were separated, keeping her informed of his activities, plans and opinions. She was his close confidante, and his devotion apparently never waned. In 1922 he wrote to her: ". . . It was truly wonderful being together during the Christmas Days and I should constantly leap about like a kangaroo from delight and thankfulness. I only refrain from doing so because I am of such great antiquity. . . ." ²⁰ In January, 1924, after the failure of an assassination attempt, the General was swift to wire his wife, informing her of his safety.²¹

Nevertheless, Seeckt took great delight in being a "lady's man" and was an extremely popular figure with the leaders of fashion and society. Captain von Selchow wrote of this side of Seeckt's life:

"Flirtation with beautiful women played a major role in my General's private life, And therefore also in mine, for a personal adjutant must indeed be aware of everything! Flirtation was witty, pungent recreation for Seeckt, the intense brain-worker, and was necessary for his wellbeing! Without being told anything, I had to sense whether this or that beautiful lady was a rising or a setting star. For he could be bitterly disagreeable if one allowed the falling comet her usual daily telephone conversation with 'him.' . . . However, he was equally disagreeable if I did not grant the lady of the moment her request."²²

Lieutenant Colonel von Linstow confirms his

predecessor's account of Seeckt's mild but active flirtations.²³

Besides these personal qualities, Seeckt had many characteristics which bore even more directly upon his work. He was a fervent patriot but an enemy of what he called the "Drunken-Patriotism" (*Trunkenheitspatriotismus*) of the Right Radicals. He was deeply conscious of his duty and responsibility to the German People, which he felt should override personal likes, dislikes, and desires. This sense of duty fitted in well with his love of the military life and military work: "With full trust in the Officer Corps I have advanced to the top of the *Heeresleitung*. I have lived thirty-five years in the Army and for the Army. The remainder of my strength belongs to it. . . ." ²⁴ Throughout his active career and beyond, this love of the Army remained with Seeckt.²⁵

General von Seeckt's abilities as a military leader are attested by the success with which he took over a still dismantled collection of semi-autonomous units, only beginning to emerge from the anarchistic *Freikorps* stage, moulded them into a unified and disciplined fighting force capable of serving successfully as a cadre for a multi-million-man army. His ability is also attested by the officers who served under him during World War I and afterwards, and even by men who, like General von Lüttwitz and Lieutenant Commander Ehrhardt, were his foes.²⁶

Seeckt was an excellent speaker and wrote clearly, simply and well. In military and

²³*Ibid.* Stück 290, Linstow, p.2.

²⁴Rabenau, *Seeckt*, pp. 239-40.

¹⁸Seeckt Papers. Stück 291. *Erläss* to Troops (Rabenau Notes, p. 43); Stück 281, Extracts from Hasse Diary, pp. 27-28, 12.10.1923; Stück 287, Stüpnagel Notes from Diary, p. 15; Stück 278, Extracts from Hasse Dairy, ca. Aug. 1922.

¹⁹*Ibid.* Stück 281, Extracts from Hasse Diary, ca. May 1925.

²⁰Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 279.

²¹*Ibid.* pp. 392, 419, 725, *passim*. Seeckt Papers. Box 33; Stück 290, Linstow, II, p. 2.

²²Seeckt Papers. Stück 289, Selchow, p. 6.

²⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 239-40, 339, 409, 419. Seeckt Papers, Stück 88, Letter: Seeckt to Gen. v. Kraewel, 15.1.1921; Stück 119, *Erläss* to Generalstäbler, 7.7.1919; Stück 278, Extract from Hasse Diary, 9.8.1922.

²⁶Rabenau, *Seeckt*, pp. 220-27, 190-91, 188-89, 198, 415. Ramcke, General H. B. *Vom Schiffsjungen zum Fallschirmjärgeneral*. Berlin, 1943, p. 153. (Hereafter cited as Ramcke, *Vom Schiffsjungen*.) Ledebur, Ferdinand Freiherr von. *Die Geschichte des deutschen Unteroffiziers*. Berlin, 1939, p. 519. (Hereafter cited as Ledebur, *Unteroffizier*.) Seeckt Papers, Stück 289,

military-political matters he was thoroughly self-assured, carrying through his policies gradually but with determination.

Always prepared to accept full responsibility for his actions, he scorned any attempt to shift blame to anyone else's shoulders. When Germany accepted the Allied rejection—at Spa—of the German request that they should be permitted to retain a 200,000-man army, Seeckt informed the Officer Corps that he shouldered the responsibility for accepting this ultimatum on behalf of the Army. In 1926 he took full responsibility for permitting the Crown Prince's son to attend the maneuvers of the 9th Infantry Regiment, even after he realized that this affair would have serious repercussions (which eventually culminated in Seeckt's resignation from the army).²⁷

While determined in pursuit of a policy, Seeckt was not doctrinaire. He analyzed the situations carefully and accepted what appeared to him to be the logical solution, even if it were unpalatable. Deception was foreign to him and he descended to it only when he considered that the national interests absolutely demanded it—and then only with the consent of the Government.²⁸

More than once Seeckt admitted that Germany's defeat in World War I had been caused by the policy pursued by her military leaders. In a speech at Hamburg in February, 1920, he said: "How did things appear in Germany during those Winter and Spring months of the last year [of the war]? The Old Army completely destroyed through its

own fault. . . ."²⁹ To General von Winterfeldt he wrote: "... I realize that it is all our fault, and that the demand for the Armistice came from Ludendorff. And why were we not victorious! . . ."³⁰

The same quality of realism led Seeckt, a Monarchist, to agree to serve the Republic because he recognized that the Monarchy could not be revived: "... He must stress as his basis [of decision], that in History something which has ended does not return in the same form, and that everything must grow organically. He wished to help in this."³¹

Seeckt was never carried away by the sentimental laments of those who claimed that the acceptance of Versailles had been a blot upon the honor of the Officer Corps or of the Army. On 7 July, 1919, he wrote: "... One hears that our honor is injured. The honor of the Army and its Officer Corps is based unshakeably on years of faithful peacetime work and rests as the seed of future times in the blood-drenched battlefields of the world. Concerning his own honor every man is, in the final instance, his own judge. No enemy and no peace treaty can take it from me. Our honor is unimpeachable so long as we perform our duty."³²

The soul of personal neatness and order, throughout his life Seeckt was a foe of "paper-shuffling" tendencies within the military bureaucracy and of long-windedness in speeches and critiques. In these daily, but vital, matters, as well as in the great issues of the times, he championed simplicity and common sense, working tirelessly for efficiency and clear thinking as opposed to waste and self-deception.³³

Testimony of Capt. v. Selchow, p. 2. Gordon Papers, II, *passim*. Freksa, Friedrich, ed. *Kapitän Ehrhardt* Berlin, 1924. p. 182. Kesselring, Albert. *Soldat bis zum letzten Tage*. Bonn, 1953. p. 18. (Hereafter cited as Kesselring, *Soldat*.)

²⁷Rabenau, Seeckt, pp. 183, 283-84, 545. Seeckt Papers, Stück 118, Speech to Officers of *Reichswehrministerium*, 10.7.1920; Stück 118, Official Order to the *Reichswehr*, 10.7.1920; Stück 17, Copy of Report of C.O. of Inf. Regt. 9.

²⁸Seeckt Papers, Stück 118, Speech to Officers of *Reichswehrministerium*, 10.7.1920; Box 33, pp. 247-48.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Stück 111, Draft of Hamburg Speech, 20.2.1920.

³⁰*Ibid.*, Stück 90, Letter: Seeckt to Gen. v. Winterfeldt, 19.2.1919.

³¹*Ibid.*, Stück 9, Report of Speech to Friends, 22.4.1920. (Indirect quotation.)

³²Seeckt Papers, Stück 119, *Erläss* to all *Generalstäbler*, 7.7.1919.

³³*Ibid.* Stück 130, Order concerning Critiques, 25.7.

Naturally, Seeckt's character was not without drawbacks which affected his official life. His greatest disadvantage as a military leader stemmed directly from his basic personality. He was a very difficult man to work for, as even men personally devoted to him have admitted. His self-assurance led him to discount the abilities of others, a trait particularly exasperating to his civilian colleagues. He considered himself indispensable and, although he recognized the right of others to hold opinions contrary to his own in theory, he reacted sharply to opposition in actual practice. When someone brought him a proposal he invariably found something about it to criticize. He took affront easily, often at very minor things, and would then withdraw himself from the active conduct of business. On the other hand, he rarely if ever asked one of his adjutants to perform special services for him and never complained about cold, heat or dampness.³⁴

Seeckt himself recognized that he was not an easy superior to serve, as occasional references in his correspondence indicate. In early 1919 he wrote to his wife: "[Captain] Gräser handles the most offensive part of the work—dealing with the Soliders' Councils rabble. He can talk with them very well; what is more, he can also get along with me, which is perhaps equally difficult. . . ."³⁵ Despite his recognition of this shortcoming, Seeckt was never able to uproot it. He continued to be a hard master throughout his long years of service.

1925; Stück 119, *Erläss* to all *Generalstäbler*, 18.10.1919; Stück 130, Order for Reduction of Red Tape, 5.12.1925; Stück 290, Testimony of Lt. Col. v. Linstow, II, p. 3. Rabenau, *Seeckt*, pp. 146-47, 170. Seeckt, Hans v. *Gedanken eines Soldaten*. Berlin, 1929. pp. 9-10.

³⁴Seeckt Papers, Stück 118, Speech to Officers of *Reichwehrministerium*, 10.7.1920; Stück 278, Hasse Diary, 8.10.1921 and Nov. 1922; Stück 281, Hasse Diary, p. 25, ca. 27.9.1923; Stück 290, Testimony of Lt. Col. v. Linstow, II, p. 1; Stück 289, Testimony of Capt. v. Selchow, p. 5; Stück 88, Letter: Seeckt to v. Kraewel, 15.1.1921. Rabenau, *Seeckt*, pp. 179, 255, 337-38, 341.

³⁵Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 143.

Another shortcoming which reduced his efficiency and that of the *Reichswehr* appeared only in his very last years of active duty. After 1923, Seeckt betrayed a tendency towards relaxation and began to oppose innovations which he would have welcomed in earlier years. These tendencies made themselves particularly apparent in the fields of personnel policy and tactics and resulted in considerable friction within the *Heeresleitung*.³⁶

Certain of Seeckt's ideas and convictions deserve mention even though they did not specifically and explicitly appear in his military policies. A "Great Prussian" of the Bismarckian school, Seeckt was a fervent admirer of the old statesman, whom he had occasionally encountered in his youth, and his ideas on foreign and domestic policy were in general accord with those of his model.³⁷ Thus, in 1923 Seeckt stated that, in his opinion, the primary requirements of a viable German policy were: ". . . maintenance of the unity of the *Reich*; reattainment of the ability to defend herself; honorable foreign policy maintenance of the power of the state within her borders. . . ."³⁸

The General also believed that Germany, as an entity, must stand above questions of politics and of personal interests. In early 1924, at an officers' conference, ". . . Seeckt declared in conclusion, that the interests of the officer and the nation lay in the German State, which we must preserve from all class and party struggle. Every step along this path will strengthen us *vis à vis* the rest of the world and enable us to make friends of the states with whom our interests correspond

³⁶Seeckt Papers, Stück 278, Rabenau Notes for Seeckt, p. 29; Stück 287, Stülpnagel Testimony, p. 12; Stück 290, Testimony of Lt. Col. v. Linstow, p. 2. Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 476. Gordon Papers, II, Letters No. 27b (Stülpnagel).

³⁷Seeckt Papers, Stück 158, Draft Constitution, 4.2.1924. Rabenau, *Seeckt*, pp. 271, 305.

³⁸*Ibid.*, Stück 154, Letter: Seeckt to Staatskommissar v. Kahr (Bav.), 5.11.1923.

without having to sacrifice the natural development of our internal policy."³⁹

Seeckt was a soldier by conviction, profession and feeling. He belonged to the old school of thought which considered all soldiers who maintained general standards of decency and competence to be honorable representatives of a common profession, and who believed that nationalism should not be permitted to override a decent respect for an honorable foe. This belief in the international character of the military profession is very well expressed in the following passage, written in 1929:

"... The newspapers busy themselves today with a statement which I gave to an English newspaper concerning the death of Marshal Foch. Now again the one will praise and the others attack [it] and both without understanding. I did it because we must again return to respectable formalities among soldiers. We can still poison or otherwise slay one another while recognizing such forms. I wrote: The internationalism of death permits the former foe also to 'lower his sword' before the coffin of the Marshal, who was a great Frenchman and a great soldier. That is also directed against internationalism and pacifism when one understands it properly."⁴⁰

Seeckt was heartily opposed to nepotism and pressure from friends for favors. Lt. Col. v. Linstow testified: "The General was an enemy of Protection. Occasionally—although not very often—acquaintances turned to him concerning acceptance of a son, nephew or other relative as [a] cadet, etc. I

can remember no case in which such a letter was not sent along through normal channels like any other."⁴¹

Seeckt was very fond of the externals of soldiering, especially after 1923, although he chafed somewhat under the formalities attendant upon his own office. He liked the parades and formations; he was intoxicated by marching troops and martial music, and he paid close attention to such matters in his comments on the state of the Army. At times he seemed to allow his feelings to push him beyond the peak of efficiency where such matters were concerned.⁴²

One point in his military life in which Seeckt allowed sentiment free rein was in his relations with the Tradition Battalion of his old regiment, the Alexander Regiment. He always attended the meetings of the veterans of the old regiment and only missed the usual Christmas Eve of the Tradition Battalion in 1926, after his dismissal and during his later sojourn in China. There are frequent references to the Alexander Regiment and its successor in his correspondence. On 3 September 1922, he wrote: "... An uncommonly satisfying and successful day yesterday. 3d Division, former Guards, Brandenburg, Silesian, Posener Regiments. . . . During the parade of the division, I drew my sword and led by the 3d's Battalion 9, the Alexander Battalion. . . ."⁴³

One further characteristic in Seeckt's complicated and often contradictory personality

³⁹Seeckt Papers, Stück 281, Rabenau Notes for Seeckt, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁰Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 641. Seeckt's attitude, interestingly enough, is echoed in Field Marshal Auchinleck's tribute to Marshal Rommel: "... If I say, now that he is gone, that I salute him as a soldier and a man and deplore the shameful manner of his death, I may be accused of belonging to what Mr. Bevin has called the 'trade union of generals.' So far as I know, should such a fellowship exist, membership in it implies no more than recognition in an enemy of the qualities one would wish to possess oneself, respect for a brave, able and scrupulous opponent and a desire to see him treated, when beaten, in the way one would

have wished to be treated had he been the winner and oneself the loser. This used to be called chivalry: many will now call it nonsense and say that the days when such sentiments could survive a war are past. If they are, then I, for one, am sorry." Young, *Rommel*, p. xii.

⁴¹Seeckt Papers, Stück 290, Testimony of Lt. Col. v. Linstow, II, p. 2.

⁴²Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 485. Reichswehrministerium, *Comments*, 1923, p. 9. Seeckt Papers, Stück 290, Testimony of Lt. Col. v. Linstow, II, p. 2. Gordon Papers, II, Letter no. 27b (Stülpnagel).

⁴³Rabenau, *Seeckt*, p. 276. See also Rabenau, *Seeckt*, pp. 162, 432. Seeckt Papers, Stück 290, Testimony of Lt. Col. v. Linstow, II, p. 2; Stück 72, Letter: Genlt. a.D. v. Kries to Seeckt, 11,11.1923.

should be mentioned. If one is to judge from random remarks scattered through his correspondence, Seeckt shared the comparatively mild "social" anti-semitism so prevalent among upper-class Germans. He occasionally makes slighting remarks about individual Jews and felt dubious as to how truly patriotic a Jew could be considering his nature and background. According to his adjutant, Captain v. Selchow, Seeckt blocked the appointment of a candidate for Finance Minister because he was Jewish. On the other hand, and here the contradiction enters, Seeckt had personal friends who were Jewish, like Theodor Wolff, the editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*. Too, while Nazi allegations that Frau von Seeckt was partially Jewish were not true, her foster parents were Jewish and she and Seeckt maintained close relations with them. Therefore, it seems safe to say that the General showed signs of a vague prejudice but was far removed from the fanaticism of the Nazis.⁴⁴

Seeckt's position within the *Reichswehr* was an assured one. Within a year or two of his accession to power, an overwhelming majority of the officers of the *Reichswehr* stood behind him. A few extreme radicals, especially in Bavaria, execrated him. After 1923 a few officers of the *Heeresleitung*, like Lieutenant Colonel von Schleicher, Lieutenant Colonel Joachim von Stülpnagel and Colonel von Blomberg felt that he was not sufficiently progressive, while others, like General Hasse, were mildly critical of some of his day-to-day decisions. Some generals felt that Seeckt did not treat them with suffi-

cient tact. However, the Officer Corps as a whole stood solidly behind him and his policies. Even some of the officers who were later Nazi-inclined considered Seeckt a great soldier and followed him loyally while he commanded the *Reichswehr*.⁴⁵

General von Choltitz undoubtedly expresses the opinions of most of his comrades when he says: ". . . Yes, we were extremely content with General von Seeckt and his policy. General von Seeckt had soon won for himself, as a result of his superior personality, a position in the Army which was entirely unquestioned among the officers serving with troops. . . . He was undoubtedly the greatest soldier of his time and had won the love and respect of the Officer Corps."⁴⁶

This man, General Hans von Seeckt, guided the *Reichswehr* through its formative years, placing the stamp of his personality upon the entire mechanism and upon its parts, and many of his lessons carried over beyond the Nazi assumption of power. Some of the soldiers among the men of 20 July 1944, may well have remembered his words: "Concerning his own honor every man is, in the final analysis, his own judge," when they made the decision to break the oath they had sworn to Hitler. If he had lived, Seeckt might have been of their number—as were his fervent disciple and biographer, Lieutenant General Friedrich von Rabenau and his last junior adjutant, Colonel Hans Ottfried von Linstow. Seeckt sometimes failed to take prompt action against an evil or abuse, but once he had made his decision he carried it through fearlessly.

⁴⁴*Vorwärts*, 40 Jhrg., No. 615, p. 3, 3.11.1923. Seeckt Papers, Stück 282, Abschrift from *Völkische Beobachter*; Stück 289, Testimony of Capt. v. Selchow. Rabenau, *Seeckt*, *passim*, see especially pp. 162, 174, 176. Gesster Papers, IV, Letters: Dr. Gesster to H. J. Gordon, Jr., 26.10.1953. Stenographic Report of Hitler Trial of 1924. EAP 105/7, Part I. Envelope "A", 26.2.1924 (Hitler). p. 72.

⁴⁵Röhm, Ernst. *Die Geschichte eines Hochverrätters*. Munich, 1928, p. 181. Ramcke, *Vom Schiffsjungen*, p. 153. Ledebur, *Uteroffizier*, p. 519. Rabenau, *Seeckt*, pp. 134, 190-91, 220-27, 231. Seeckt Papers, Stück 281, Hasse Diary, 4.9.1923, 12.10.1923, May 1925; Stück 289, Testimony of Capt. v. Selchow, p. 2. Gordon Papers, II, *passim*. Kesselring, *Soldat*, p. 18.

⁴⁶Gordon Papers, II, Letter no. 3 (Choltitz).



NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THE PAPERS OF NAVAL OFFICERS: WHERE ARE THEY?

BY JOHN D. HAYES

Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)

A rich but virtually untouched fund of source material for military literature exists in the papers of Army, Navy, and Air Force officers that are deposited with various libraries and historical societies throughout the country. Such papers in the main consist of private files which include personal correspondence with families, friends and contemporaries, journals, files of orders, written articles, and addresses. Their value lies primarily in the fact that they complement official reports on the same subjects.

A partial list of the places where papers of various officers of the Navy can be located is given below. Similar lists for the papers of Army and Air Force officers will be published in later issues of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. These lists are by no means complete and it is hoped that this publication will bring out additional information.

The largest source of naval officers' papers are those in possession of the Naval Historical Foundation, which are presently in the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division. The Foundation, by agreement with the Library has been placing its naval and maritime collections there since 1949 with the understanding that in 1969 a decision will be made as to their final disposition.

The Naval Historical Foundation Collection at the present time consists of over 300 boxes containing the papers of approximately fifty naval officers plus considerable miscellaneous material. The Foundation intends to continue its acquisitions and deposits. The Collection can be used without restrictions with a few exceptions. An itemized description of it has been prepared by the Library staff.

The NHF Collection's most notable item is its 26 boxes of papers of the four naval generations of the famous Rodgers' family. Other important sets of papers in this Collection are those of Stephen B. Luce, William F. Fullam, Hilary P. Jones, Albert Gleaves, and Washington I. Chambers, pioneer of ship-board aviation. It also has some David Porter papers.

The Collection is rich in naval manuscript material on the Civil War. In addition to the Rodgers and Luce papers there are those of the Selfridges, father and son, S. P. Lee, Colhoun, Radford, Roe, Stevens, and Surgeon Horner. One interesting item is an account of the war service of Lieutenant Samuel P. Carter who, while temporarily detached from the Navy, served four years in the Union Army and rose to rank of Major General of Volunteers. Additional papers

of S. P. Lee are at Princeton University. Additional Horner papers are at the University of Virginia and both sets include excellent material for a study of shipboard medicine during the period.

The Library's own collection of naval officers' papers is almost as large as that of the NHF. It includes those of David Dixon Porter, Alfred T. Mahan, Thomas MacDonough, John A. Dahlgren, Andrew A. Harwood, Richard P. Hobson, Charles S. Sperry, and others. The Dahlgren group of official papers is quite large. Additional illuminating private letters of Dahlgren are in the Newberry Library, Chicago. The Library of Congress also has the papers of many of the Secretaries of the Navy. The printed lists of the Library's manuscript material should be consulted for other naval source material.

The largest group of naval officers' papers outside of the Library of Congress is in the Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina. This Collection is rich in papers of Confederate naval officers including James Barron, Franklin Buchanan, John N. Maffitt, Richard L. Page, James H. Tomb, William C. Whittle, and John Taylor Wood. The papers of George B. Balch who remained in the Union Navy and became Superintendent of the Naval Academy as well as those of a number of officers of the modern navy can also be found at the Southern Historical Collection.

Duke University has the papers of James H. Rochelle of the Confederate Navy and Louis M. Goldsborough, Edward Kershner and Franklin E. Smith of the Union Navy. Rochelle's papers are important for the Navy's part in the defense of Charleston, S. C., and Smith's give an accurate picture of shipboard life on the blockade.

The New York Public Library has a miscellaneous collection of papers of Porter,

Worden, Drayton, Dana Greene, Jenkins, Radford, Harwood and others plus considerable material on the Potomac River flotilla. The library has published the letters of Percival Drayton.

The Longwood Library at Kennett Square, Pa., has the extensive collection of Samuel F. DuPont. Other important naval collections are the Maury family papers at the University of Virginia, the papers of George H. Preble and Charles H. Davis at the Massachusetts Historical Society, and those of Casper H. Goodrich and John S. Barnes at the New York Historical Society. Barnes who resigned after the Civil War and became a railroad executive collected a great deal of naval historical source material, including much on John Barry. This material is still uncatalogued.

The Naval War College has an excellent set of letters of the early Presidents of that institution,—Luce, Mahan, Taylor and Stockton. Some of these have been reproduced for the Naval Historical Foundation.

The papers of William S. Sims and those of William S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations during World War I, are believed to be still in private hands.

There is a need to locate the papers of other naval officers who contributed much to the U. S. Navy such as those of French E. Chadwick and George W. Melville, neither of whom took time to write an autobiography.

MILITARY AFFAIRS ON MICROFILM

Volume I through Volume XVIII, 1937-1954, are now available on microfilm. Address inquiries to *Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, Washington 25, D. C.* Complete series \$26.55; minimum charge, \$1.00.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE CURRENT HISTORY PROGRAM

BY HARRY B. YOSHPE†

Your editorial, entitled "Needed—A Uniform Current History Program," in the winter 1955 issue of *Military Affairs*, was noted with interest. The editorial points up a need which has long been felt, and should stimulate appropriate corrective action.

Actually, the requirement for an annual "Summary of Major Events and Problems" (see DA Memo 335-80-1, 14 July 1953) is but part of a broader mission charged to the Army historical units. That mission encompasses, in addition, the rounding out of the World War II histories of the agencies and the preparation of comprehensive historical accounts of the agencies' experience during the period of the Korean conflict.

In most instances, preoccupation with the World War II and Korean projects and limitations on the size of staffs have precluded the devotion of time and effort to the Summary that is contemplated in the approach suggested in the editorial. Nevertheless, the Summaries do provide useful signposts for the preparation of broader, more rounded analyses that will serve to keep the agencies' histories on a current basis. At the same time, if well planned and properly executed, the Summaries can serve as useful media for guidance, orientation, and training in respect to current operations. The latter purpose would become increasingly evident with the passing of time, turnover of personnel, and retirement of current records.

The potential usefulness of the Summaries for orientation purposes was recognized by

the Office of the Chief of Staff in the original memorandum calling for this report.

These summaries are regarded as valuable not only for historical purposes but equally important as operational reports to enable each agency to maintain a continuous review of its policies and administration and for orientation of incoming personnel.*

A recent ban on the processing and distribution of these Summaries, however, precludes their use for informing, indoctrinating, and guiding agency personnel.

It is recognized that the shortage of funds compels the reduction of the number and volume of Army publications. Essentiality should be the criterion for publication at all times. It is doubtful, however, that the ban on the reproduction of historical Summaries is in the best interest of the Army. Tradition has always been a vital element in the military service, and the Army's history is an important medium for giving formal expression and permanence to this sense of tradition. Whether engaged in planning or in current operations, the military profession is heavily dependent on the record of experience as a guide to action. Only through objective historical analysis can we evaluate the effectiveness of past organizations, policies, and programs, and formulate plans for future efforts.

No historian worth his salt will have much enthusiasm for historical writing which is

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*Memo, Brig Gen J. C. Oakes, Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, to Comptroller of the Army, *et al.*, 6 Jan 53, sub: History of Department of Army Activities.

calculated to result in one or two manuscript copies that will gather dust in file cabinets. Nor can the agencies be expected to show much enthusiasm for a program when its output is thus circumscribed. A reasonable amount of processing and distribution of the Summaries and other products of the historical program should be permitted: (1) to afford opportunity for extensive review by personnel conversant with developments recounted; (2) to provide a ready reference tool in the agency's operating, planning, training, and orientation programs; and (3) to stimulate a greater appreciation of the objectives and requirements of the program and thereby elicit improved participation by all supporting elements.

The need for a continuing historical program appears to be generally recognized. It must be established on a firmer basis, however, and buttressed for strong and imaginative leadership at the top, if it is to realize its full measure of usefulness in the fulfillment of the current and future mission of the Army. No directive, however strongly worded, can replace deeds, in the form of end products of enduring value and correlative services, in insuring the continuance of the historical efforts. The agency historians, however, would be helped considerably in their efforts if a concrete and well-balanced program were laid down for accomplishment.

Such a program should: (1) prescribe the writing of military history as a continuing responsibility; (2) incorporate the current military history activity as an integral part of the Army Program System with definite schedules for its accomplishments; (3) emphasize the need for presenting historical accounts with the highest degree of objectivity and impartiality; (4) stress the importance of having professional historians on the scene, to keep tab on developments, maintain close contact with key personnel, and

build up the historical documentation needed for well-rounded and objective accounts of the agency's experience; (5) insure limited reproduction and dissemination of the historical output subject to review and approval by the Office of the Chief of Military History.

For the immediate future the primary emphasis must necessarily be laid on the preparation of accounts of the agencies' experience during the period of the Korean conflict. At the same time, steps should be taken to lay the foundation for keeping the history current. The annual Summaries are helpful means to this end. As the work on the Korean portion of the history is completed, the historical sections can use these Summaries and their supporting documentation as a point of departure for the development of well-rounded narrative accounts at regular intervals. There would thus be provided cumulative accounts of the agencies' experience on a continuing basis, with the advantage of the perspective required for objective evaluation.

Besides improving the quality of their Summaries and bringing their histories up to date, the historical units can render many other vital services. They can undertake the preparation of special studies in areas of particular interest to their agencies. They can collect, appraise, highlight, and make available to agency personnel pertinent studies of other agencies and of outside scholars, universities and research institutions. They can cooperate with agency officials in their conduct of research and the compilation of reports in specialized fields, providing leads to background studies and documentary materials, and assisting in the preparation of logical and lucid narratives. Further, the knowledge acquired by the historians in the prosecution of the program can be put to effective use in the agencies continuing education and information programs.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

The Politics of The Prussian Army 1640-1945

By Gordon A. Craig. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. Pp. 536. \$11.50.)

This is a well-written, well-articulated, and well-documented history of the political activities and influence of the leaders of the Prussian Army and their successors in the armies of the Kaisers, the Republic, and Hitler. The growing interest of students of military history in the problems of civil-military relationships should be further stimulated by works of such a caliber as Professor Craig's volume.

With a formidable mustering of the monographic and published sources augmented by certain collections of documents captured by the Allies in World War II, the author develops the thesis that the Army was one of the major obstacles, probably, indeed, the most important obstacle, in the path of democracy in Germany. This is an opinion that was widely held by German liberals and intellectuals since early in the nineteenth century. To those who hold this view it is the ability of certain powerful army leaders to maintain the independence of the military establishment from parliamentary control and to operate politically and militarily on their own that accounts for the failure of parliamentary government in Germany. Overlooked, however, is the fact that civilian authority over the armed forces is essentially a secondary objective in the struggle of parliaments for supremacy. Of primary importance is the adherence to parliamentary government, or the acquiescence in it, of the dominant classes in a society, from which the military leaders are drawn. Furthermore, without control or strict limitation of the

executive, a parliament cannot direct the armed forces of a nation. Thus the failure of democracy in Germany, at least prior to 1919, is more likely to be explained in the failure of German liberals to master the aristocracy and the monarch than by their failure to dominate a single institution, the army. German democrats wasted much time and effort attempting to steer their military wagon without first bridling their horses.

Although the title of the book indicates that it deals with the political affairs of the entire army, it is largely confined to detailing the activities of a relatively few influential generals, as if the army were all of a piece behind its leaders. This attitude is more justifiable, perhaps, in dealing with the Prussian Army than with any other, but there were certainly periods in its history when even the Officer Corps was divided. Professor Craig treats a few such instances but, again, mainly as a struggle of leaders. He does not often concern himself with the political views of the rank and file, though these must have had some influence on the classes that supplied the cannon fodder. Nor does he deal extensively with such matters as the veterans' organizations, except for the paramilitary organizations of the *Freikorps* type. Thus the work lacks an explanation of the Army's hold over large segments of the lower and middle classes and of its political consequences.

The author is at his best in the period between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. He offers the most lucid account available of the rise to power of the General Staff. He also presents some new material on the period of the Weimar Republic. His treatment of the years from 1640

to 1807, however, is rather sketchy, and his story of the Hitlerian era is inadequate and extremely short.

The shortcomings of the volume are insignificant when compared to the contribution Professor Craig has made to our understanding of the relations between the German Generals, their King and Kaiser, and the political figures who attempted, with little success, to control or to cooperate with them. The student of military affairs can buy this book with the assurance that it will not be soon outdated by a more definitive work.

WILBER W. HOARE, JR.
Arlington, Virginia

Military Policy and National Security, Edited by William W. Kaufmann. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. Pp. 274. \$5.00.)

In a day when the Soviet Union is fast approaching a position where it will have nuclear weapons and delivery means adequate to its needs, a continuing reappraisal of the national security policy of the United States becomes imperative. Accompanying such reappraisal is an equally imperative need for understanding of national policy on the part of the citizenry.

The series of essays comprising this book contributes much to the consideration of policy and to the appreciation of a number of the factors involved. The volume does not attempt to spell out the answers; rather, it debates certain of the major issues involved. The essays are a part of the continuing program of studies centered upon problems of defense and national security currently undertaken by the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

Does nuclear war spell mutual destruction? Can we rely solely upon the Strategic Air Command to deter aggression? What is a policy of deterrence? If war occurs, to what extent can it be limited, and by what means? What are the pros and cons of our world-wide system of coalitions and alliances? What of the West German Army and its future in NATO? Does military potential have the same meaning in a nuclear age that it had a decade ago? What of passive air defense?

These questions are posed and discussed in such a manner as to lead logically to a final chapter on the relationship of military power to foreign policy. The volume is thought-pro-

voking throughout. It provides the government official, the responsible citizen, and the student with a stimulating background for further research of the problems of "Military Policy and National Security."

S. G. TAXIS
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The Direction of War by Air Vice-Marshal E. J. Kingston-McCloughry (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1955. Pp. 261. \$4.00.)

As the title indicates, this is a thesis of the problems and responsibilities of high command by a professional military leader who speaks authoritatively from experience. Few histories provide such first-hand and penetrating analyses of the human factors which make up the high direction of war. Yet Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughry lays it on the line, unhesitatingly weighing the substantial influence on decision of such imprecise elements as personalities, jealousies, traditions, precedence, and prestige.

The author has a keen perception of the requirements of modern war, from the head of state on down. "Indeed, total war now places a more direct responsibility in the business of war outside the purely fighting Services," he writes, "and it is vital that a more direct interest should be taken by civilians who are not subject to the discipline which by its nature and reticence naturally muzzles members of the Services."

Although the Air Vice-Marshal makes this point abundantly clear, he proposes no solution. In order to interest and educate civilians from the head of state on down to the voter, it would seem that military science and history would have to be introduced into the public educational system. For example, in the author's judgment, the greatest leaders of the British Commonwealth were Marlborough, Smuts and Churchill—all political leaders who started as professional soldiers. The inference is clear that an understanding of military science is fundamental to outstanding statecraft.

The debilitating partisanship of the separate armed services, Army, Navy, and Air Force, on the clear direction of war are repeatedly indicated, beginning with the rivalry between the Army and Navy in the Seven Years War. Examples are given of the conflict between rival joint commanders in the Cartagena and Scheldt expedi-

tions, and of the inadequate joint planning as the cause of the Dardanelles disaster of World War I. Later, the same errors were repeated in the Norwegian campaign of World War II. It seems that military knowledge has to be ever re-learned by painful and tragic experience.

Far-reaching military decisions made by civil leaders who have meagre conception of war are vividly described in this book. One such incident occurred after the German break-through at Sedan in 1940. The RAF had been denied the authority to bomb in Germany during the long months of the "phoney" war. Now that the war was no longer phoney, the military chiefs of staff requested authority to bomb the narrow passes of the Ardennes through which were streaming the Nazi troops. The Cabinet approved except for two leading Labour Ministers who were away at a Labour conference. When they were reached three days later and their agreement gained, two other Ministers retracted their former approval. The bombing never took place. One wonders if the German's success in 1940 was entirely due (as we the public were led to believe) to his superior equipment. Certainly the Anglo-French political direction of war fostered the swift German victory. Later it was Hitler's personal interference with the German high command which balanced the scale of sunders and reversed the trend.

The painful and halting struggle to achieve recognition of the value of air power and the RAF is well brought out in the book. Even after saving England in the Battle of Britain, the RAF was denied the "privilege" of mounting the guard before Buckingham Palace. It seems that the age of a service determines the honors it is entitled to rather than its worthiness as a defense force. The author explains some of the resistance to and misunderstanding of the RAF to the fact that "little Air Force history was taught when our Statesmen and Civil Servants were at school." The question might be asked "Is any being taught today?" Certainly there is negligible air history being taught in U. S. schools.

No military library will be complete without *The Direction of War*. This is one of the best books on high command to be produced since the end of the war.

BRIG. GEN. DALE O. SMITH, USAF
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Dir. of Plans, DCS/O, H.Q. U.S.A.F.
Washington, D. C.

Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces Year-book 1955. Edited by Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield, (New York: Macmillan, 1956, \$9.50.)

Among the few publications in the military field which may lay claim to consistently high quality over a long period of time *Brassey's Annual*, first published in 1886, is pre-eminent. The continuing appearance of this excellent annual, which has no American counterpart, gives convincing testimony to the vigor of British thinking and writing in the military field.

In a brief review it is impossible to provide more than the merest hint of the solid and valuable articles contained in the 1955 edition. The British Admiralty estimates of 1956 Russian naval strength will be of interest to naval officers. Dr. Bernard Brodie, discusses the evolution of air doctrine, in which he critically examines the Douhet concepts which have lain at the base of much Air Force doctrine, and discards them on the basis of World War II experience. While noting their renewed vitality with the development of nuclear weapons, he contends that the development of the H-bomb is so momentous that it tends to destroy Douhet who believed only in the offensive and unlimited war. Since an unlimited war is now a war of mutual annihilation, it is highly likely that future wars may well be limited conflicts such as the Korean War.

The twenty-nine remaining chapters include discussions of such topics as U. S. Strategic Air Command, regular troops vs. guerillas, training, aircraft development and production, the balance of power, defense of shipping, several area studies, the role of the aircraft carrier, and civil defense.

While contents of this annual cannot be said to be built around any one central theme, many of its articles deal with the major question before military planners today. Admitting that the development of nuclear weapons represents a revolution, what form will that revolution take and what are its implications for the respective services?

To this question there is no one accepted answer. Editor Thursfield, in a short survey chapter entitled "Defense Policy in the Melting Pot" reviews some of the main areas of disagreement. He finds that the traditional British emphasis on seapower offers only a partial safeguard. Against modern types of attack air defense must take precedence over sea defense. What the

role of the Navy should be is another disputed question. Some airmen insist that the Navy no longer needs new ships. On the other hand, Rear Admiral A. D. Torlesse argues with the backing of considerable recent history, "... the aircraft carrier will often be the only means of bringing air power swiftly to the support of ground forces on the spot." Among many fields of disagreement there are to be found a few concepts held in common. One such conclusion is that defense policy represents only one method of national defense and that it must be conducted with a far closer attention to political aims than in the past.

DONALD W. MITCHELL
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Wings of the Dawn: A Study of Air Power as a Contribution to Civilization. By Eugene E. Wilson. (Hartford, Connecticut Printers, 1955. Pp. 170. \$3.50.)

Here is an unusual book by an unusual man. It deserves careful reading by anyone with an informed interest in policies for keeping the United States secure, and particularly by persons anxious to probe behind the waves of agonizing second-looks which surge so rhythmically through our daily press.

Mr. Wilson is truly qualified to write thoughtfully about the impact of air strength on U. S. policy. A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy he won his wings and was serving with Admiral Reeves when true carrier doctrine was born. Later, as a Commander, he resigned from the Navy to enter the aircraft industry where he served in an executive position for two decades, having been President of United Aircraft Corporation during the critical war years. The book flows directly from an effort inspired in 1943 by James V. Forrestal, to evolve a sound air policy for this nation; a policy conducive to real partnership among her industries and armed services.

The author does not devote great space to evaluating evidence advanced by proponents of this or that specific school. Yet with quiet authority he manages to lay the myth that Douhet could not have influenced thinking among American airmen because his work was not available in English until about 1940.

In *Wings of the Dawn* an experienced airman recognizes that one gains insight into the future

by analyzing man's reaction to similar problems from his past. Unfrightened by the bogey of absolute destruction, he reemphasizes the restrained use of sea power that enabled Britain to enforce her *Pax Nautica*. Then he uses converging argument—ranging from the ethical to strategic pragmatism—to suggest that only in a similar vein can this nation or any nation make effective use of powered flight.

One need not agree completely with its author to enjoy the intellectual stimulus this book affords. It is encouraging to see emerge, among the absolute claim and counter-claim of the airborne controversy, the kind of middle position advocated down through the ages by thinkers like Aristotle and St. Augustine.

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The War at Sea, Volume 1, The Defensive. By Captain S. W. Roskill, RN. (London, H.M. Stationery Office, New York: British Information Service, 1954. Pp. 664. \$7.50.)

The British Official War Histories of both World Wars have generally been outstanding in scholarship, comprehensiveness and style. This first of three volumes on the maritime side of the last war meets all these standards. It has the additional advantage of being written by a professional officer, a senior naval captain of the regular service who himself had known the lonely responsibility of a naval command.

Throughout his work, Captain Roskill stresses two aspects of maritime warfare: the influence which the movement of merchant shipping has on it and its complete dominance by the air arm. He traces the differences and changes in thinking in the Navy and the RAF during the pre-war years and how these differences were resolved, often painfully, in the reality of war. The work of the Coastal Command of the RAF, after it became strong and competent enough to meet its responsibilities, is recognized and respected throughout the book. Through most of the war the Coastal Command was under the operational control of the Admiralty and Roskill leaves the impression that this arrangement, in so far as protection of shipping in narrow waters was concerned, at least equaled in effectiveness the single responsibility, carrier dominated system of

the U. S. Navy. On the German side, cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Navy lessened as the war progressed.

The volume begins with a general chapter on Maritime Warfare and Maritime Strategy. The reader is thereby acquainted with the scope and abstract quality of the subject. The book throughout treats maritime strategy from a high level point of view and deals primarily with assumptions, plans, and their execution rather than with the details of combat. The descriptions of battles that took place as part of the execution of over-all plans and world wide dispositions are given tersely but clearly in a few paragraphs. The author says of the Battle of the River Plate, "A detailed description of the battle . . . will be of less interest to posterity than the ocean wide strategy that lead to it." For teaching the lessons of naval history this is a more useful volume than Morison's comparative work on the U. S. Navy.

However, none of the mobility of the sacrifices made by the Navy and the Royal Air Force is lost in Roskill's restrained language. One feels the sorrowful pride he expresses for ships like the destroyers *Oldworm* and *Acasta* which alone and against hopeless odds put the battle cruisers *Hipper* and *Scharnhorst* out of action for several critical months, or for the men of the Naval Air Arm and RAF who after fighting bravely, resourcefully, but hopelessly in Norway were all lost in the carrier *Glorious* while returning home.

Roskill outlines some excellent lessons for U.S. naval officers whose experiences were mainly those of gaining control of vast ocean areas. "Aims of maritime strategy," he says, "is not so much to establish complete control as to develop ability to establish zones of maritime control wherever it is necessary. From the confusion of arms he identifies the three elements of maritime strength: combat; support ashore and afloat; and transport, either merchant shipping or amphibious. He shows the necessity of controlling large-scale naval operations from shore where communications and adequate staffs are available instead of under the restrictive conditions afloat.

The diagramatic work in this volume is outstanding. Operations are plotted on forty-two charts of adequate scale and with latitude, longitude, and depths of water clearly indicated. There are many important appendices included and the index consists of forty-three pages. A

delightful feature are the quotations at the beginning of each chapter. This worthy volume is an indictment of the U. S. Naval Profession which does not seem able to write its own history.

JOHN D. HAYES

Rear Admiral USN (Ret.)
Annapolis, Md.

A History of Fortification From 3000 B.C. to A.D. 1700. By Sidney Toy. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. Pp. 262; Illustrated; Index; \$5.75.)

One of the most ancient forms of the military art was the defense of cities and the palaces of kings. The walls and towers of fortifications more than four thousand years old are still visible in some places, and numerous examples of military architecture from the furthest antiquity to the age of gunpowder give visual evidence of the defensive systems. Mr. Toy's study embraces the whole world. A large collection of excellently reproduced plans and photographs illustrate admirably the types of military architecture and the swings in military history that have occurred as defense or attack gained the ascendancy.

Well chosen and well told examples of siege warfare show that until gunpowder gave the advantage to the attack, the well defended feudal castle was usually able to withstand the siege "engines" that could be brought against it. This was true because the castle was almost always built in an impregnable position. Its high walls, interspersed at intervals with towers, with well defended gates giving entrance to the interior, insured superiority to the defense.

Walled cities date from the beginning of recorded history. The cities rarely had the advantage of an impregnable location possible for a castle. Walls had to be constructed around the cities wherever they were located, and elaborate siege methods were developed, which filled up ditches and advanced enormous movable towers higher than those of the defense. The text and the illustrations show the progress through the centuries of the means and methods of defensive works.

In its scope and general excellence, Mr. Toy's study of permanent fortification covering nearly five thousand years is undoubtedly the best presentation of the subject available in the English language.

DONALD ARMSTRONG
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Washington, D. C.

The War Memoirs of General de Gaulle: The Call to Honour, Vol. One. (New York: The Viking Press, 1955. Pp. 319; Index. \$5.00.)

In the spring of 1934, a certain Colonel Charles de Gaulle wrote a book. It advanced for the French army a new theory of strategy and tactics which mightily displeased the top echelons of that army. But his ideas, as the event disclosed, appealed to some foreign leaders, thereby illustrating once again that "a prophet is not without honor, save in his own country."

There were a few of his compatriots who agreed with de Gaulle. There was, for example, notably M. Paul Reynaud. The Army, however, held rigidly to its concept of the fixed and continuous front. Maneuver and the offensive were not in favor. Tanks and aircraft were to be used only for reinforcing the line and for local counter-attack. And the successive governments of both right and left were deaf to de Gaulle's arguments.

Handing the initiative over to the enemy displeased de Gaulle. So his book "proposed the creation, as a matter of urgency, of an army of maneuver and attack, mechanized, armoured, composed of picked men, to be added to the large-scale units supplied by mobilization."

Six years later, after nothing had been done to follow his recommendations and after nearly half a year of the phony war, this persevering prophet "addressed to the eighty chief persons in the government, the High Command, and politics a memorandum whose aim was to convince them that the enemy would take the offensive with a very powerful mechanized force, on the ground and in the air; that our front might therefore be broken through at any moment; that if we had not ourselves equivalent units of riposte, we were in great danger of being annihilated; that the creation of the required instrument ought to be decided on at once; that, besides pushing the necessary manufacture, it was urgent to gather into one mechanized reserve those units, already existing or in course of formation, which could, if need be, form part of it."

This was on January 26, 1940. Everyone recalls the broad outlines of the tragedy of the six weeks war and the fall of France in June of that year. General de Gaulle tells his story of the French defeat, military and political, in a memorable and moving contribution to the history of the second World War. With justifiable pride, he starts with a narrative of his futile efforts to wake up

the military and the politicians to the revolution in warfare brought about by the internal-combustion engine. Frustration followed as a consequence of inertia and ineptitude and the result was the defeat and the armistice.

General de Gaulle refused to accept defeat, but he was almost alone in a courageous faith in ultimate victory. He joined his feeble forces, the nucleus of Free France, to the British, badly shaken after Dunkerque, and in London Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle began side by side the long, arduous years needed to prove that no war is lost until the leaders think it so.

The first volume of these memoirs is notable for revelations of hitherto unknown aspects of the war, for the character delineations of many of the chief actors on the allied side, for the detailed account of de Gaulle's stewardship of the Free French until the middle of 1942. It is the eloquent autobiography of a fighting man, of an angry man who maintained the objective against unbelievable odds, and who said to Winston Churchill: "I am responsible for the interests and destiny of France."

The ancient Romans erected a statue to the general who saved them in one of Rome's darkest hours, with this inscription: "Because he did not despair of the Republic." Modern France might well set up a monument to General de Gaulle with the same inscription. In the meantime one might point to these magnificent memoirs and say, "If you would see his monument look around."

DONALD ARMSTRONG
Brig. Genl., USA, Rtd.
Washington, D. C.

France Against Herself; A Perspective Study of France's Past, Her Policies and Her Unending Crises. By Herbert Leuthy. (New York: Praeger, 1955. Pp. 476. \$6.50.)

Mr. Leuthy has written a magnificent and needed book. *France Against Herself* is deeply perspective: the result of long experience and much research. In view of the past greatness of France and her immeasurable contributions to the world, the contrast of her present internal problems is startling. This book traces, with logic, the pattern of history which sets forth the France of today, at one and the same time, as a political weakness and a major strength of the Free World.

The author writes with an obvious love of France; yet as a Swiss, he is able to approach his

subject objectively.

If any book constituting a major political study, and written since World War II, is deserving of the accolade "classic," it is *France Against Herself*. For any student of European affairs to miss this book is unthinkable.

S. G. TAXIS
Colonel, USMC

Enoch H. Crowder, Soldier, Lawyer and Statesman, by David A. Lockmiller (Columbia, Mo., U. of Missouri, 1955. Pp. 286 Pp. 12 bibl. \$5.00.)

This well-written story of the life of Enoch H. Crowder is much more than a simple biography. The span of years covers the post-civil War era through World War I.

By following the progress and promotion of Crowder, we are given a true picture of the status of the American Army, from its role as Indian fighters, to its growth through the Spanish-American War and the Mexican Border Campaigns to the Allied Expeditionary Force of World War I.

General Crowder's greatest achievement was the initiation of the Selective Service Act of May 1917. It was mainly through his efforts that the draft was established under the concept of local boards. By using this method, not only was the registration completed in record time, but also, the draft was removed from political implications. The fine reputation established in World War I has been continued and certainly adds to the acceptability of the draft during peacetime.

In addition to his work on Selective Service, Crowder was very influential in the organization of the governments in the Philippines and Cuba with particular emphasis on the judicial branch. This facet of his work clearly brings out the important influence of foreign-based military commanders in diplomatic affairs as well as in purely military matters.

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The American Wars: 1755-1953 a Pictorial History from Quebec to Korea. By Roy Meredith. (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Co., 1955. Pp. 349. \$10.00.)

For those who like their history pictorial as well as literary, *The American Wars* is welcome fare indeed. The author, Mr. Roy Meredith, is well known for his previous works in similar vein,

Mr. Lincoln's Camera Man: Mathew B. Brady and The Face of Robert E. Lee.

Not only does his new work picture our wars, from the French and Indian to the Korean, through the eyes of witnessing artists, but also it provides the first history of those American "combat" artists.

Much heretofore unpublished material is included. The early periods are represented by many official sketches of the French and Indian Wars, Trumbull's and Peale's Revolutionary sketches and oils, and Porter's sketches from his journal of the voyage of the Frigate *Essex*.

The Mexican War is well represented by James Walker's paintings and Walke's naval drawings. Many seldom-seen works of Winslow Homer, Alfred Waud, and others tell the story of the Civil War. The art of the Indian Wars is dominated by Remington. But then who else portrayed this era so well? Remington's Spanish-American War work is present, of course, but so is that of William Glackens and his is virtually unknown. It seems Glackens' bout with tropical diseases delayed the completion of his work for McClure's Magazine until the war was no longer topical. As a result it was never published and was relegated to obscurity for these fifty years.

In World War I the Army engineers commissioned a group of eight top artists. Their best work as well as that of Marine John W. Thomson are represented. The art of World War II could fill many volumes. To compile a representative selection is no mean task. The problem is further complicated by the fact that each participant feels himself a qualified critic and has his favorite pictures. Meredith includes all elements of the war. Air and sea warfare are dealt with adequately. The amphibious operation, which rivals these as a spectacular, is, if anything, overdone.

Some very fine art of the Korean War is presented. Again one wonders at the absence of the Army's artists. The only drawings of ground combat are by Navy artists and presumably show Marines.

Nevertheless, Meredith has made a valuable contribution to the popularization of American military history as well as to the history of American art. The on-the-scenes impressions of military life and battle, particularly that of the pre-photographic period, put flesh on the sometimes dry bones of written history.

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Psychological Warfare. By Paul M. A. Linebarger. (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1955. 2d edition. Pp. 308, appendix, index, 79 illustrations, 10 charts. \$6.00.)

To many people psychological warfare and Paul M. A. Linebarger became synonymous in 1947 with the appearance of the first edition of *Psychological Warfare*. Now, with the second edition this impression is bound to become even more widespread.

The principal addition to the second edition lies in a new Part Four, extending from page 244 to 308 and embracing three chapters and an appendix. Here the author considers the cold war and "seven small wars"; strategic international information operations; and the questions of research, development, and the future. In the most valuable appendix is contained a detailed discussion of the Military Psywar Operation of 1950-53.

The second edition is not only up to date and greatly expanded but it is also a clear record of the author's more deliberate thinking on his

earlier material coupled with the additional experience he obtained during the Korean episode. Thus the edition manifests itself as a readable and logical book useful as a text for serious students as well as providing understandable, interesting reading for layman and soldier alike.

As the first 243 pages are identical with the first edition it suffices to say that the book repeats the three basic sections of: definition and history; analysis, intelligence, and estimate of the situation; and planning and operations.

The beauty of Dr. Linebarger's book is that he tells what psychological warfare is, what it does, how it is fought, and who fights it. All this is treated in such a fashion as to make a painless masterpiece of instruction.

This book should be read by all civilians as preparation for the onslaughts of propaganda to come and by military men as a most necessary training manual in the military art of the present and future.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

INTELLIGENCE COURSE OFFERED

Political Science 651, a new graduate course in "Basic Intelligence Methods and International Communication," at the University of Pennsylvania, boasts a number of unique features. It is the first university course anywhere to apply the techniques of overt intelligence research and analysis as long practiced by official agencies of all major countries, to scholarly tasks in such fields as economics, politics, and international relations. These techniques have been particularly developed to estimate "the strengths, weaknesses, and probable courses of action" of foreign countries. Thus, they are well adapted to serve the academic, governmental, and business community in the evaluation of world affairs.

Among other important objectives of P.S. 651 are the following: an increase in the exchange of accurate information between nations, a reduction of international traffic in false and injurious propaganda, and encouragement of better understanding among all peoples. Some attention is also being paid to existing abuses of the process, secret intelligence operations, counter-intelligence or "security" activities, and political, economic, and psychological warfare.

The course is being conducted by the husband-wife team of Dr. George Bell Dyer and Dr. Charlotte Leavitt Dyer, a teaching "first" at the University. Both of the Dyers, members of the Institute of Cooperative Research, have had distinguished careers in U. S. Army Intelligence. Their private collection of "unclassified" source materials on U. S. and foreign intelligence, housed in

the Dyer Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies located on their Bucks County Farm, provides a rich base for the course. The Institute provides mimeographed documents and audio-visual aids for the use of students and gives them access to the thousands of books and additional materials deposited there.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC RESEARCH

The editor's mailbag contains an item from Meredith P. Gilpatrick, who states that "While completing my own manuscript on 1871-1914 military strategy I came across Raoul Girardet's *La Société militaire dans la France contemporaine 1815-1939* (Paris 1953). It treats of the sociological aspects of the French Army, especially the officer corps. This approach was more or less neglected by Challener, his focus being primarily on political and economic sources [*The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939* (New York, 1955)]." Gilpatrick adds that he is associated in operating an enterprise of a scholarly nature called "Bibliographic Research," whose services are available for historical, scientific, and legal research. It is located at Box 25, Worthington, Ohio.

WASHINGTON CWRT ELECTS NEW OFFICERS

The District of Columbia Civil War Round Table held its annual elections on 8 May 1956. The following members were chosen for the several offices: President, Kermit V. Sloan; Vice President, Captain Samuel G. Kelly; Secretary, Colonel J. Gay Seabourne; Treasurer, Elden E. Billings. The following are members of the Executive

Committee: Brig. Gen. Carl A. Baehr, Karl S. Betts, Beverly C. Coleman, V. C. Jones, Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant III, Rear Adm. John B. Heffernan, Rex B. Magee, Admiral J. F. Shafroth, and Congressman William M. Tuck of Virginia. General Baehr, the same evening, gave a very interesting lecture on "The Washington Artillery in the Civil War." The Washington Artillery, as is well known, was a famed silk-stocking outfit from New Orleans, which originated in 1838, fought through fourteen major engagements of the Civil War and, as the 141st Field Artillery in World War II, was commanded by General Baehr.

The highly interesting and ably edited *News Letter* of the District of Columbia Round Table is getting a new editor in the person of the irrepressible Rex Magee. Colonel Gene Gempel, the retiring editor who served two years, deserves a big hand for the excellent job he did during his stewardship.

NEW LIFE MEMBER

It is a pleasure to welcome a new life member to the American Military Institute, Lieutenant Russell J. Parkinson, USAF. Lieut. Parkinson is presently located at Ellington Air Force Base, Houston, Texas.

Incidentally it may be noted for those who contemplate this type of membership that its present modest cost of \$50 may be raised in the not too distant future by the Board of Trustees.

BOLLING HOSTS AIR FORCE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION MEETING

More than a score of Aviation "greats" including some of the founders of the United States Air Force gathered in mid-June to participate in the Third Annual Meeting of the Air Force Historical Foundation, at Bolling Air Force Base.

Executive Director of the Foundation, Maj. Gen. Orvil A. Anderson, USAF, (Ret.) headed the all-day session which included the election of six new members to the Board of Trustees.

Those elected were Maj. Gen. Jacob E. Smart, Asst. Vice Chief of Staff, Hq. USAF; Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith, former Director of Education, Air University; Dr. Albert F. Simpson, Chief, USAF Historical Division; Maj. Gen. R. L. Copsey, USAF, (Ret.); Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody, USAF, (Ret.) and Mr. James Straubel, Editor, *Air Force Magazine*.

The afternoon session featured lectures and discussions on the subjects "Air Power In Being" and "Air Power Potential," with guest speakers—Maj. Gen. John P. McConnell, Strategic Air Command, and Brig. Gen. Marvin C. Demler of the Air Research and Development Command.

Prominent members present included Maj. Gen. Benjamin Foulois, USAF, (Ret.) President; Major Alexander P. deSeversky, Second Vice President; Maj. Gen. St. Clair Street, USAF, (Ret.) Treasurer; General Carl Spaatz, USAF, (Ret.) first Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; Brig. Gen. T. DeWitt Milling, USAF, (Ret.); Lt. Gen. Wm. E. Kepner, USAF, (Ret.); Mr. Marvin W. McFarland, Library of Congress, and others.

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The American Military Institute, in furtherance of its great purpose to stimulate the study of military history, has an obvious and urgent patriotic duty. The "long haul" may end in devastating tragedy unless America squarely faces the problem of military education. It is up to the AMI to rapidly fill the yawning gaps of military ignorance in the scholastic system of the United States. D.O.S.

EDITORIAL



TOWARD MILITARY ENLIGHTENMENT

In the words of the President of the United States, this is an "age of peril." Never has America's very existence been threatened as it is today. Never before has it been possible for an enemy to penetrate to the heart of America and unloose such frightening munitions as to virtually obliterate her proud cities and the free people living there.

Never before has it been possible for such an attack to be marshalled and launched in terms of hours. Never before have vast military forces been able to cross the seas and arctic wastes at such breath-taking speed.

Never before have the consequences of defeat looked so dismal and hopeless. Past wars have been fought against civilizations having free enterprise systems and moral codes based on divine principles. But today we face an aggressive rival who would deny individual freedoms to all, wiping out hard-earned savings and all concepts of individual honor and responsibility to a Supreme Authority.

In return, our survivors would be provided an ant-like regimentation, a moral code based on State edict, and a cynical, fearful existence cloaked in perpetual suspicion of fellow men. Yes, America has never before faced such gruesome consequences of defeat, and this combined with the real possibility of massed slaughter on our home front from nuclear weapons.

With all this clearly understood, America is not aroused to the danger. At no time, even in the midst of hot wars, has our country been so desperately threatened. Yet complacency and optimism reigns. Prosperity

abounds, and amidst such good times, how can we regard the threat seriously?

Intellectual understanding, if not emotional acceptance, has kept the United States in a high state of military readiness. At no time before has the United States maintained such strong armed forces in peace, or accepted without serious debate such enormous military budgets. Unhappily, the average citizen believes his duty toward national security is thus fulfilled. He does not realize that modern total war is a problem to be faced by the entire electorate.

National security cannot be purchased. It must be striven for by all. Voters elect leaders who make major national security decisions. These leaders appoint others. Rarely are military professionals found among their ranks.

Very few schools and colleges treat military subjects as respectable courses for study. What few military degrees are offered have no real standing. Military history is often purged from other history courses and from political science and international relations curricula. Where, then, can the average voter acquire a military understanding? How many civilians who control our military destiny have any fundamental knowledge of military history and policy?

If military study is not included with other education, how can wise civil control of the military be expected? From what sources can a basic military understanding be acquired? How can successful national security decisions be forthcoming from those without a balanced and realistic picture of international life?

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The aim of the American Military Institute is the encouragement of the serious study of all aspects of military (including naval and air) history. In the furtherance of this end the income from funds donated by Hilario Camino Moncado has been set aside to award biennially a cash prize for an original book-length manuscript in any field of United States military history. Manuscripts will be judged on the basis of thoroughness of research and quality of presentation as well as originality of contribution.

Inquiries regarding the competition for the award should be addressed to the Secretary of the American Military Institute.

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The objects of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE, as stated in its Certificate of Incorporation, are "to stimulate and advance the study of military history,

especially that of the United States; to diffuse knowledge thereof by publications, displays, and otherwise; and to acquire and preserve manuscripts, publications, relics, and other material relating thereto."

Persons who wish to become members are invited to submit their names to the Secretary, American Military Institute 1529 - 18th Street, N. W., Washington (6), D. C. Annual dues are \$3.50; life membership, \$50; benefactor, \$250; and patron, \$500. Institutions and organizations may subscribe to MILITARY AFFAIRS.